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ABSTRACT 
Self-selection plays a dominant  role in determining  the size and 
composition  of immigrant  flows.  The United States competes  with other 
potential  host countries  in the "immigration  market".  Host countries  vary 
in their "offers"  of economic  opportunities  and also differ  in the way they 
ration entry through their  immigration  policies.  Potential  immigrants 
compare the various opportunities  and are non-randomly  sorted  by the 
immigration  market among  the various  host countries.  This paper presents a 
theoretical  and empirical  analysis  of this  marketplace. The theory  of 
immigration  presented  in this paper  describes  the way in which immigrants 
are sorted among  host countries  in terms  of both their  observed and 
unobserved  characteristics. The empirical  analysis  uses Census  data from 
Australia, Canada,  and the United States  and shows that  U.S. 
"competitiveness"  in the immigration  market  has declined  significantly  in 
the postwar period. 
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1.  Introduction 
Immigration  has been  an  important  component of demographic  change  since 
Biblical  times.  International  differences  in economic  and political 
conditions remain  sufficiently  large to encourage  the flow  of millions  of 
persons across  national  boundaries.  United  Nations  statistics,  for example, 
report  that in the 1975—1980  period, nearly  5 million  persons  migrated  to a 
different  country,  with  nearly  two thirds of these  individuals  migrating  to 
one of three  countries,  the United  States, Canada,  and Australia.1  There 
exists,  therefore,  a large  reservoir  of  persons  who believe that  better 
opportunities  exist  elsewhere  and who are willing  to incur costs  to 
experience  those opportunities.  These two conditions  imply  that  the pool of 
migrants  will  not be randomly  chosen  from  the population  of the countries  of 
origin,  and that it will  not be randomly distributed  across the potential 
countries  of destination.  Instead the pool of immigrants  in any  host 
country  will be composed  of the subsample  of  persons  who face  better  oppor- 
tunities  in that  particular  host  country  than  either  in the country  of 
origin or in other  potential  host countries,  and whose  migration  costs are 
sufficiently  low to make the move profitable. 
The insight  that  migrants  may be systematically  different  from  persons 
who do not choose  to migrate  has long  played  an  important  role  in 
sociological  and historical  studies of the  irrsrd.gration phenomenon (see,  for 
example,  the studies  contained  in Jackson,  1969)  .  The  selectivity  hypothesis 
has also played  a major role in  the modern  economic  literature  that  analyzes 
how immigrants  do in the tLS. labor market.  For example,  the early studies 
of Chiswick (1978)  and Carliner  (1980)  invoke  the assumption  that immigrants 
are positively  selected  from  the population  of  the countries  of origin  to explain  the remarkable  cross—section  empirical  finding that immigrant 
earnings (after a short  time  period)  "overtake"  the earnings  of natives with 
the same  observed  socioeconomic  characteristics,  such  as age and education.2 
1y recant  work in this  area (Borjas, 1985,  1987) has addressed  two 
related  questions  raised  by the early studies.  Since  most of the literature 
that analyzes  immigrant  earnings  focuses on the study  of single  cross—section 
data sets,  my 1985  paper raiosd  the possibility  that  the 'overtaking" 
findings  could  be due to the fact that cross-section  regressions  confound 
aging  and cohort  effects.3  The positive  correlation between  immigrant 
earnings  and years  of residence  in  the U.S. observed  in  the cross—section 
could  arise  because  immigrants  "adapt" rapidly to the U.S.  labor market,  or 
because  earlier  waves  of immigrants  differ  in substantial  ways (labor market 
productivities,  unobserved  abilities  or  skills) from the more recent  waves. 
Eorjas (1985) adapted  well-known  techniques  (see, for example,  Heckman,  1983) 
to separately  identify  aging  and cohort effects using  the 1970 and 1980 U.S. 
Censuses.  This  methodology,  which  "tracks" synthetic  cohorts  of immigrants 
over time,  showed that:  (a)  immigrant  assimilation  was not as fast  as the 
cross—Section  studies  indicate;  (b)  the more  recent  immigrant  waves  performed 
substantially  worse  in the labor market  than  the early  postwar  waves; and 
(C)  there was little  likelihood  that  the most recent  immigrant  waves  would 
ever earn substantially  more than  natives of comparable  age and education. 
n  important  insight  provided  by  the study of synthetic  cohorts  is that 
invoking  the assumption of positive  selection,  though  it may be correct  for 
some  cohorts  of ixrartigrants, may be completely wrong  for other cohorts of 
immigrants.  This raises  the important  question  of exactly  which factors 
determine  whether immigrants  are  positively  or negatively  selected  from  the 
population  in  the countries  of  origin.  Borjas (1987) presents  an initial 
attempt to address  this problem  and derives a simple economic  model of 
—2— selection  on the basis of unobserved  characteristics  (which after  all form 
the focus  of much of the literature  on imnigrant earnings) 
.  This model, 
which will be discussed  in detail below, shows  that  there is no general  law 
stating  that imuigrants  must  be positively  selected.  In  fact,  under  a 
reasonable  set of conditions  it is likely  that  inunigrants are negatively 
selected (i.e., persons  who have  below  average earnings  and productivities 
are the most likely  persons  to migrate  to the United  States).  My empirical 
analysis  revealed  that positive  selection  was more likely  to characterize 
ixmnigrants from  the advanced  industrial  countries,  and negative  selection 
was more likely  to characterize  iimoigrants from  the Third  World countries 
that form  the bulk  of migration  to the U.S. in the pot—l65  period. 
This paper  expands my earlier work in  a number  of significant  ways.  The 
theoretical  analysis  below  will argue that  although  most of the literature 
has focused  on the role  that selection  in  unobserved  characteristics  plays in 
determining  ixmnigrant  earnings,  there  is also selection  in observed  charac- 
teristics  such  as  education,  Surprisingly,  it is easy to show  that  there  is 
no relationship  between  the types  of selections  that are generated  in 
unobserved  characteristics  and the types  of  selections  that are generated  in, 
for example,  education.  It is completely  possible  for the most  educated 
persons to migrate to  the U.S. (i.e., positive  selection  in education),  but 
for these  persons  to be the least productive  persons  in the population  of 
highly  educated  persons  (i.e., negative  selection  in unobserved  character- 
isticS)  .  The  analysis  below  will  present a number  of propositions  that 
yield  insights  into  the process that  determines  the selection  of immigrants 
in these two separate  dimensions  of "uality. 
The empirical  analysis  in this paper  expands my previous  work  in two 
ways.  First, it presents  a detailed  analysis of the U.S. earnings  of 
immigrants  by focusing  on the roles played  by both selection  in observed 
'-3— characteristics  and in unobserved  characteristics.  It will be seen that a 
number  of the theoretical  predictions  are confirmed  by the data.  Second,  as 
noted  earlier,  potential  migrants  can choose  among a number  of  countries  of 
destination. The empirical  analysis below  will  present  a systematic  Study  of 
the selection  biases  generated  by  the sorting of migrants  among  three 
potential  countries  of  destination:  Australia,  Canada,  and the United 
States.  It will be seen  that both  country-of-origin  and country—of- 
destination  characteristics  play  an important  role in determining  the 
performance  of immigrants  in any labor market. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  Section 2 presents  a theory  of 
immigration  based on the hypothesis  that migration is determined through  the 
process of  wealth—maximization.  Section 3 presents  the  basic empirical 
framework  that will  be used  throughout  the analysis  to test the various 
propositions  predicted  by the economic model  of immigration.  Section  4 
presents  the empirical  analysis  on the earnings  of ixrsnigrants  in the United 
States, while Section  5 compares the performance  of immigrants  in  the U.S. 
labor market  with  the performance  of ixmnigrants in  Australia  and Canada. 
Finally,  Section  6 zuxmrarizes the main results of the Study. 
2.  Ii  rat  ion 
2.1.  !!2X_2l 
Migration  is assumed  to flow  from  country  0,  the country  of origin  or the 
"homer  country,  to country  1, the country  of  destination  or,  for 
concretenees,  the United  States.  This simple  framework  ignores  three 
potential  complications.  First, it is likely  that persons born in the United 
States  also consider  the possibility  of migrating  to other countries,  and 
perhaps many of them  do so.  Second, even  persons  choosing  the United  States 
as a country  of destination  may find that things did not work Out  (or perhaps 
worked  Out much better  than  expected)  and some return  migration  is  generated. 
—4— Third, individuals contemplating migration in  a  particular country of origin 
enter the "immigration market" in  which a number of other host countries 
(such  as Australia  and  Canada)  compete for the immigrant's human  and physical 
capital.  Little is known  about the size and composition  of the migrant flows 
from the United States to other countries, and hence these possibilities are 
ignored in  what  follows.  Much more,  however, is known  about the size and 
composition of  the flows from any given home country to  each of  three 
potential host countriea (Australia,  Canada, and the United States), and the 
implications of  the simpler two-country model will be  applied below to the 
more  general framework where potential migrants decide not only  whether or 
not to migrate, but also choose a country of destination. 
Residents of the home country face an earnings  (w)  distribution given by: 
£nwXS0+E0  (1) 
where X is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics with value S  in  0 
country 0, and the disturbance  is independent of K  and is normally 
distributed with mean  zero and variance & 
0 
The earnings distribution facing individuals in the United States 
is given by: 
Zn  w1  (l—M) xS  + M K 5, + e1, 
(2) 
where M is a dumsoy variable indicating if the individual is foreign-born or 
native.  The vector 5  gives the value that the U.S. labor market attaches to me 
n 
socioeconomic characteristics K for natives.  This valuation may differ due 
to  discrimination or  other unobserved factors from the value 5  that the 
labor market attaches to the characteristics brought in by  potential migrants.  The disturbance  is again  independent  of X (and M)  and is 
normally  distributed  with  mean zero and variance a  Finally,  the random 
variables E  and  have  correlation  coefficient  p. 
Equations  (1) and (2)  completely  describe  the earnings  opportunities 
facing  a potential  migrant (as well  as  U.S. natives)  .  Three  questions  are 
raised  by this simple  framework.  First, what factors  determine  the size of 
the migration  flow  generated  by  the income-maximization  hypothesis?  Second, 
what  types  of selection  in  the unobserved  characteristics  a are created  by 
the endogenous  migration  decision?  Third, what  types  of selection  in the 
observed  characteristics  X are created  by the endogenoua  migration  decision? 
The migration  decision  is determined  by the sign of  the index  function: 
i  tn [ —- 3  [  x  ( 8—8 )  - it 
] 
+  (e1-e,  (3) 
where C gives the level of mobility  costs, and  it  gives  a "time—equivalent" 
measure (iv  w/C) of the costs  of  migrating  to the United  States. 
The level  of migration  costs C is likely to vary across  individuals  for 
two reasons:  First,  there  are time  costs  associated  with  migration,  and 
these  time  costs  are likely  to be higher for persons  with  higher  opportunity 
costs.  Second,  there  are transportation  costa  associated  with  migration,  and 
these  direct costs include not only  the air fare (which is likely  to be 
constant  across  individuals),  but also moving  expenses  of family and 
household  goods,  and it is  reasonable  to suppose that  these  expenses  may also 
be a positive function  of w.  These assumptions  give little  hint as to how 
the time—equivalent  measure  of  mobility  costs,  it,  varies  across  individuals. 
It is instructive  to first assume  that  it  is constant  across  individuals 
since  the main implications  of the Roy model  are clearest  in this special 
case.  The analysis  below  will show that the treatment  of  it  as a random 
variable  in the population  does  not substantially  alter the analysis,  and 
—6— will,  in sons  instances,  reinforce  the conclusions  of the simpler  model. 
Since migration  to the United  States  occurs  when  I > 0,  the  emigration 
rate  from  the  country of origin  for persons  of given  characteristics  X is 
given  by: 
—  {  > - 
{ 
—  ]  }  1  — D(z),  (4) 
where V =  z  —(X(5—ö0) 
— fl/; and  is the standard  normal 
distribution  function.  If the characteristics  X have  a joint density 
function  given  by  f(x), then  the emigration  rate  from  country  0  is given  by: 
P  P(x)f(x)dx.  (5) 
xeL2 
Equations  (4) and (5)  suzrsnarize the  (rather obvious)  economic  content  of 
the theory  of migration  proposed  by  Hicks  (1939) and further developed  in 
Sjaastad (1962).  In  particular,  the emigration  rate is:  (a) a negative 
function  of mean income  in the home  country .L  x6); a positive  function 
of mean income  in the United  States ().L  = X1);  and a  negative  function  of 
migration  Costs.  such of the literature on the internal migration of persoos 
in the United  States is devoted  to testing these  theoretical  predictions  (see 
the survey  by Greenwood,  1975) 
The  irrsmigration  literature,  on the other hand,  has not historically 
focused on explaining  the size  of migration  flows, but on explaining  their 
composition  or labor market quality.  As  far back as  1919,  for example, 
Douglas was asking  whether or  not the skill composition of immigrant  cohorts 
was constant  across  successive  immigrant  waves.  The theory  of  migration 
implicit  in  equations  (1)-CS)  has important  implications  about  the selection 
biases  that characterize  the pool  of migrants  both in  terms  of unobserved  and 
—7— observed characteristics.  Consider initially the selection mechanism  in the 
unobserved  characteristios S  In particular,  consider the conditional 
expectations  E(Zn  w  X,  I  > 0)  and E(tn w1  X,  I > 0).  Note  that these 
means condition  on  two dimensions:  the observed  characteristics  X and the 
decision to  migrate.  Under the normality assuoçtions  these conditional 
means are given by: 
Ol 
E(Zn w 
J  X,  I  >  0)  x8  +  (P  —  (X1  (6) 
Cøi  a 
E(Zn  w1  X,  I  > 0)  =  x6  +  —a—— (—  —  p)X,  (7) 
where A  Ø(z)/P(X); and$ is  the density of  the standard normal.  The variable 
A is inversely  related to  the emigration  rate and will be  positive  as long as 
some persons find  it profitable  to remain in  the country of  origin  (i.e., 
P(X) < 1). 
Cl 
Let Q  E(S  X,  I > 0),  Q  E(c  X,  I > 0), and  k = —  .  The  0  0  1  3  0 
variables  and  measure the "quality"  (in terms of  unobserved  character- 
istics) of the migrant pool.  The Roy  model identifies three cases of sub- 
stantive interest. 
A.  Positive Selection:  Q  > 0 and  > 0. 
This type of selection exists  when migrants have above average earnings 
in the country of  origin  (for given characteristics  X(, and also have 
U.S. earnings which exceed  the earnings of  comparable US.  natives  (ignoring 
the  possibility  that immigrant earnings may  be reduced because of their 
ethnic or  racial background)  .  Inspection of  equations  (6) and (7)  shows that 
the necessary  and sufficient conditions  for this type of selection to  occur 
are: 
p > min(, 
k)  and k > 1.  (8) 
—8— If  p is sufficiently  high  and if income  is more  dispersed  in  the U.S. 
than in the country of origin,  iztsrd.grants  arriving  in the U.S. will  be 
selected  from  the upper tail  of  the home  country's  income distribution,  and 
will outperform  comparable  natives upon  arrival to the U.S.  Intuitively,  this 
occurs because  the home country,  in  a sense,  is "taxing" high—ability 
workers  and "insuring"  low-ability workers  against poor  labor market 
outcomes.  Since  high income  workers benefit  relatively  more  than low income 
workers  from  migration  to  the United  State,  (regardless of how much  higher 
mean incomes in the United  States may be  relative to  the country of  origin), 
a brain  drain  is generated  and the United  States, with  its greater 
opportunities,  becomes  a magnet  for persons  who are likely to do well in  the 
labor market 
Negative  Selection:  0  < 0 and  < 0. 
This type of selection  is defined to  exist  when the United  States draws 
persons who have  below  average incomes in  the country of origin, and  who, 
hoidin  characteristics  constant, do poorly  in  the U.S.  labor market  The 
necessary  and sufficient  conditions  for negative  selection  to  occur  are: 
p > min),  k)  and k < 1.  (9) 
negative  selection  also requires that  p be  "sufficiently"  positive,  but 
that the income distribution  in  the country  of origin be more unequal than 
that in  the U.S.  Intuitively,  negative selection  is  generated  when  the 
United  States  "taxes" high-income  workers relatively  more than the country of 
origin, and provides  better  insurance  for low—income  workers  against poor 
labor market  outcomes.  This opportunity  set leads to  large  incentive,  for 
low—ability persons  to  migrate  since they  can improve their  situation  in the 
United  States,  and to  decreased  incentives  for high-ability  persons to 
—9— migrate since income opportunities in  the home country are more  profitable. 
C.  Refugee Sorting:  Q  < 0  and  > 0. 
This  kind  of selection ooours when the U.S. draws below-average 
immigrants  (in terms of the oountry of origin), bot migrants  have above— 
average earnings  in the United  States labor market.  The necessary  and 
sofficient condition  is: 
p < min(-, k)  (10) 
In  other words, if  p is negative or "small", the composition  of the 
migrant pool is likely to  resemble a refugee population.  For instance, it is 
likely that p is  negative for countries that have  recently experienced  a 
Communist  takeover,  After all, the change from  a market economy to  a 
Communist  system  is  often accompanied by  structural changes in  the income 
distribution,  and  by  confiscation of  entrepreneurial assets and redis- 
tribution  to  other persons.  The Roy model suggests that immigrants from 
such systems will be in the lower tail of  the "revolutionary"  income 
distribution,  but will  outperform the average U.S. native  worker. 
The basic Roy  model thus provides a useful categorization  of  the factors 
that determine the guality or  composition  (in terms of unobserved 
characteristics) of  the migrant pool.  Even  at this level, several important 
implications are generated which give some insight into a number of  empirical 
findings in the literature.  For example, many  studies have documented  the 
fact that refugee populations  perform quite well in  the U.S. labor market 
when  compared  to  native workers of  similar socioeconomic characteristics. 
These empirical  results are explained by  the income—maximization  hypothesis 
and  by the fact that these refugee populations, prior to  the political 
changes which led  to a worsening of their economic status, were relatively 
-10— well  off in the country of origin.  It is, therefore, unnecessary  to resort 
to  the arbitrary distinctions between "economic" and "non-economic" migrants 
to  explain the refugee experience. 
The Roy  model  also provides an  interesting explanation  for the empirioal 
finding that the quality of migrants to  the United  States  has declined in the 
postwar period (where quality is defined by  the wage  differential between 
migrants and natives of the same measured skills)  .  Prior to  the 1965 
Amendments  to  the Immigration and Nationality Aot, ixmnigration  to the United 
States was regulated by  numerical quotas.  The distribution of the fixed 
number of quotas  aoross countries was based on  the ethnic population of  the 
United  States in  1919 and thus encouraged migration from (some)  Western 
European countries,  and strongly discouraged immigration from  other 
continents,  particularly  Asia.  The favored countries have one important 
characteristic:  their income distributions are probably much less dispersed 
than  those of  countries  in Latin America or  Asia.  The 1963 Amendments 
abolished  the discriminatory  restrictions against immigration  from non— 
European countries,  established  a 20,000 numerical limit for legal migration 
from any single  country  (subject to  both Hemispheric  and worldwide numerical 
limitations)  ,  and  led to  a substantial increase in  the number of  migrants 
from Asia and Latin America.  The new flow  of migrants thus originates in 
countries  that are much  more  likely to have greater income  inequality than 
the United  States.5  It would not be  surprising, therefore,  if the quality of 
immigrants declined  as a result of the 1965 Amendments. 
In addition, the 1965 Amendments led to  a fundamental shift in  the 
mechanism  by  which visas were allocated among potential migrants.  In 
particular, the role played  by  observable skills and  occupational 
characteristics  was deemphasized, and the role played  by family relationships 
with  relatives currently  in the United  States became the primary focus of 
—11-- the policy.  In 1985,  for example, nearly 70 percent of all (legal) migrants 
entered the United  Statea through one of  the kinship provisions  in the 
immigration  law.  The Roy model  suggests that this change  in the statutes 
will lead to  a substantial  decline in immigrant quality.  In particular,  the 
family of  the migrant that resides in the United States provides  a "safety 
net" that  insures the immigrants  against poor  labor market  outcomes and 
unemployment periods in  the months after immigration.  Low—ability  persons who 
could not migrate without  family connections in the United  States, and  hence 
without that  insurance,  will now find it worthwhile to do  so.  In  effect, the 
kinship regulations  in the immigrat  ion law create a lower bound in  the income 
distribution that low-skilled  immigrants face in the United  States, and hence 
make it more  likely  that migrants are negatively selected from the 
population. 
The theoretical  analysis yields two equations that can guide empirical 
analysis.  These equations are given by: 
=  4t1  ,lt,G,C,  ,p)  (11) 
= h)m,m1,p)  ).  (12) 
Equation  (11)  gives a "reduced form" equation, where immigrant quality 
in the United  States  (i.e.,  the wage differential between migrants and 
natives of  equal measured  skills) is a function of all the primitive 
parameters  of  the model  (i.e.,  the parameters of  the two income distributions 
and migration  costs)  .  My  earlier  paper  (Sorjas,  1987)  provides a detailed 
analysis of  the theoretical  restrictions implied by  the income maximization 
hymothesia on  the direction  of  the effects of  the various variables  in the 
model.  These effects are usually ambiguous and can be  categorized  in terms 
—12— of "composition effects" and "scale effects".  In  particular,  a change in any 
variable a will create  incentives for a different type of person  to  migrate 
(the composition  effect), and for a  different number of persons  to migrate 
(the  scale effect) 
Equation  )l2)  is  a "structural" equation and states that if knowledge 
of  X is  available,  a subset of the parameters of  the model  enter multi— 
plicatively  through the h function  )see equation  (7))  .  By  holding ). con- 
stant, the structural  equation essentially nets out the scale effect, and 
leads to more  unambiguous  predictions of  the impact of  the exogenous vari- 
ables on  the quality of insnigrants.  It is important to note  that  the h 
function  in  (12)  does not depend on  mean  income levels in the countries 
of  origin  and the country of  destination, or  on the level of  migration 
costs since these factors only  play  a role through the selectivity  vari- 
able  2.. 
Three  comparative  statics results are implied by analysis of the  2.— 
constant  structural  quality equation: 
1  An  increase in  the variance of the income distribution in  the home 
country leads  to a decrease in the quality of migrants  in the United States 
2.  An  increase  in the variance  of the  income  distribution  in the United 
States leads  to  an increase  in the quality of migrants in the United States.6 
3  An increase in  the correlation coefficient between earnings in the 
home  country  and earnings  in the United States increases immigrant  quality if 
there is positive  selection, and  decreases immigrant quality if there is 
negative selection.  The  ambiguity arises because the larger the correlation 
coefficient,  the better the  "match" between the two countries.  The 
improvement in the match  increases  the quality of the  immigrant  flow  if there 
is positive  selection,  and decreases it if  there is  negative selection. 
—13— 2.2.  Random  Mobility Costs 
These insights have been  derived from the simplest version of  the Roy 
model that treats mobility oosts  (defined as a fraotion of  potential income 
in the country of  origin) as a constant in  the population.  This assumption 
stay  be restrictive, and it is important to ascertain how its relaxation 
affects the results of the model.  Suppose that mobility costs are normally 
distributed  in the population  and can be  written as: 
(13) 
where  )L  is the mean  level of mobility costs in  the population,  and C  is 
a normally distributed  random variable with  mean  C and variance C.  The 
random variable  C  may be  correlated with C  and 1  and the correlation  0 
coeffioients are given by  p  and Pm  respectively.  The conditional 
expectations of  migrant  incomes in the home and  destination  countries are now 
given by 
moct  (  co.t  Ott 
E)Ln  w  X,  I  > C)  xS  + ———  p 
— —  —  p  —  X,  (14)  o  o  V  o  J  1tocJ 
co 
E)Zn  w1 
j  X,  I > C)  x81 + —r-  { 
—  p  ) 
—  p  —  X,  (15) 
where V'  =  C—C—C. 
Equations  (14)  and (15)  show that the addition of  migration  costs does 
not affect any of the substantive  results of the simplest version of  the Roy 
model  if  migration  costs are uncorrelated with earnings opportunities. 
However, if migration  coats are correlated with earnings  opportunities the 
tyme of seleotion that is generated may change  in either direction.  Suppose, 
for example, that migration  costs are positively correlated  with earnings 
opportunities.  For instance, high ability persons may take longer to find 
appropriate  jobs.  This positive correlation makes both  and l  more 
negative,  and hence increases the likelihood of  negative  selection. 
—14— Conversely,  if migration  costs  (measured in time units)  and  earnings 
opportunitiea  are negatively correlated,  the likelihood of  positive selection 
is increased. 
Two additional points  about this more general model  are worth 
stressing.  First,  the importance of  variable migration  costs in the analysis 
will diminish greatly if the variance in migration costs is  relatively small 
compared to  the variance in  the income distributions.  Secondly, regardless 
of how important migration costs are, the key result that negative  selection 
is more  likely  from  countries with  high levels of  income inequality  and 
positive  selection  ia more likely from countries with  more  equal  income 
distributions  is unaffected. 
2.3.  Selection in Observed Characteristics 
Equation  (4),  the probit  equation determining  the migration  rate, 
contains an  additional  insight;  The migration  rate is a function of X 
through the parameter  ience,  the migration  of persons with larger 
levels of X is more  likely if K has a higher  return in the United  States than 
in the country of origin, and the migration of  persons with lower  levels of  K 
is more  likely  if the country of  origin values the characteristic K more than 
the United  States.  A complementary analysis to  the Roy model can be  derived 
if it is assumed that the vector K consists of  only one variable, say 
education  (5),  that this  variable is  uncorrelated with the disturbances  rn 
the earnings functions,  and that this variable,  too,  is  normally distributed 
in the population.  The assumption of only one variable in  the vector K is 
irrelevant,  since the results can be easily generalized to  any number of 
variables.  The assumption  of normality,  though unrealistic  for some socio- 
economic characteristics,  does simplify the mathematics  substantially and 
allows a useful  extension of  the Roy approach to the determination of the 
observed  income distribution. 
—15— Suppose the earnings functions in the two countries are given by: 
Znw js +Ss+e ,  (16)  0  0  0  0  - 
£n  w1  =  + &1s +  (17) 
and that the education distribution in  the population of  the country of 
origin can be  written as: 
5 =  + 5,  (18) 
where C  is noa11y  distributed with  mean  zero and variance a2 
5  5 
Assuming that nobility coats are constant, the emigration  rate for the 
population  in the country of origin is given by: 
P =  Pr 
{(e2_eO) 




where t =  + (8—3), and z  — 
Two interesting questions  can be  addressed within this framework.  First, 
consider the conditional expectation of  schooling of persons who do  migrate. 
It is easy  to show  that: 
E(s 
j  I > 0)  = i + —  (8—8).  (20) 
Hence the  mean  schooling level of migrants will be  less than  or  greater 
than the  mean  schooling level of  the population depending on  which of the two 
countries values schooling more.  Positive selection in schooling will  be 
observed when (5—3) > 0,  so that the U.S. labor market attaches a higher value 
to schooling, while negative selection in schooling will  be  observed when 
< 0,  so  that highly educated individuals have little incentive to  leave 
—16— the country  of origin. 
It is important  to stress  that these  selection  conditions  have  nothing 
to do with the conditions  determining  selection  in unobserved  character- 
istics.  Any permutation  of selection mechanisms  in unobserved  and observed 
characteristics  is  theoretically  possible.  Hence  negative  selection  in 
unobserved  characteristics  (or ability) may be jointly  occurring  with  posi- 
tive  selection  in  education,  or vice  versa,  Simply  because  the United 
States attracts  highly  educated  persons  from some countries  does not imply 
that these  highly  educated  persons are the most productive  highly  educated 
persons  in that  particular  country of origin.7 
This important  insight implies that little  can be learned from  com- 
parisons of the unstandardired  earnings  of migrants  and natives. The actual 
mean  earnings of the migrant  pool in each  of the two countries  are given  by: 
2  0 
-  05  aoa  I  ol 
c.(Zn w0  I > 0)  (1s  +  ÷  )3,"S)$o  + _._ 
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p  —  X,  (II, 
a1  i 
E(Zn  w1  I  > 0)  t1 + 6  +  —'  (8—3)t  + 
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—  p  J  X,  (22) 
Mean  earnings  of  migrants  depend on the mean education  of  migrants,  as 
given  by (20), and on the mean level of their  unobserved  characteristics. 
Since  the two kinds  of  selections  are independent,  nothing  can be said about 
how the average migrant  performs  in the host country  unless  the sinds  of 
selections  that occurred  in each of the two dimensions  of quality  are known. 
This result  suggests  that generalizations  about the quality  of immigrsnts 
based  solely  on observed  education  levels  (or  other measures  of  X)  are 
extremely  misleading.  In  addition,  it is well known that observed  char- 
acteristics  such  as education,  age, marital  status,  health,  etc., explaun 
a relatively  small fraction of earnings variation  across  individuals.  It is 
not uncommon,  for example,  to find  that  the observed  characteristics  explain 
—17— much  less than  a third of the variance in  wage rates cr  weekly earnings.  The 
selection  in  unobserved characteristics,  therefore,  is empirically much  more 
important  than the selection  in observed characteristics. 
A number of comparative  statics results can be genecated by  analysis of 
equation  (20) .  Perhaps  the most interesting of  these results  is: 
ascal I > 0) 
< 
a  <  1  (23) 
That is,  a one year  increase in  the mean  education level of  the countcy 
of origin  will  increase the mean  education level of  persons who actually 
migrate  to the  United  States, but this  increase will  be by less than  one 
year.  The intuition for this result follows from  the fact that an  increase 
in  (I  will change  the size  of the immigrant flow.  Suppose,  for concreteness, 
that  (31—30) > C  so that  there is  positive selection in  education.  The 
inccease  in p  makes  it worthwhile  for more  persons to migrate,  and thus 
dilutes  the mean  education  level of the  population  of  migrants.  Hence  the 
increase in the conditional  expectation  is less than  the increase in  the 
population  mean.  An important implication of  this theoretical  prediction  is 
that the variance  in education  levels across  irmnigrants  (from different 
countries)  in  the United  States will be smaller than the variance in  education 
levels of  the actual populations  across countries  in the world.  In other words, 
the population  of  migrants  in the United  States is more  homogeneous  (in terms 
of  education)  than  the populations of the different sending countries. 
In general,  equation  (20)  implies the existence  of  observable quality 
equations analogous  to (11)  and  (12) 
(24) 
= h  (C ,C  ,p,3.t,C  ,  (25) 
—18— where Q  gives the mean level  of  the observed characteristics  of  immigrants 
in the U.S.  The estimation of (24)  and  (25),  of  course, is likely to be 
extremely difficult  in  practice since they introduce a number of  primitive 
parameters  (e.g.,  that  are unobservable  and likely to remain so. 
3.  Eirical  Framework 
Recent  empirical  research on  the earnings of  immigrants  stresses the 
importance  of  disentangling the cohort and aging effects that are confounded 
by  a single cross—section  of data.  In  the analysis presented in  this paper, 
two Censuses  in  the country of destination will  be pooled  (e.g.,  the 1970 and 
1980 U.S. Censuses),  and the following regression model will be estimated: 
Zn  w.,  x5. + a1y, 
÷ a2y 
+  tt  ?] 
+ €..,  (28) 
Znw  =xS +ylt  +E  ,  (2°( 
nZ  Zn  nZ  nZ 
where w,, is the wage  rate of immigrant j, wf 
is the wage rate of natove 
person  8;  X s  a vector  of socioeconomic characteristics  (eg., education, 
age, eto.(;  y is a variable measuring the number  of years that tne inmigrant 
has resided In  the country of destination; C is a vector of duumy variables 
indicating the year  in  which migration occurred;  and S is a dummy variacle 
set to  unity  if the observation  is drawn  from the 1980 Census, and rero 
otherwise.  The vector of parameters  (a;,a;)  along  with the age coefficients  in 
the vector X  provide  a measure of the assimilation effect  (i.e.,  the rate at 
which the age/earnings profile of migrants  is converging  to the age/earnings 
profile of natives),  while the vector of parameters  estimate the cohort 
effects. The period  effects are given by  for immigrants  and by  7n for 
natives. 
The model  in equations  (26)  and (27)  is underidentified.  In particular, 
some  of  the right hand  side variables in  the immigrant earnings function are 
—19— perfectly  collinear.  Suppose,  for example,  thst the immigrant  arrived  in 
cslendar  year  9 so that 
C9 
1.  Then: 
y  (T—k—9) + mk  (28) 
where  T is the calendar  year in which the latest  cross-section  is observed 
and k is the number  of  years  separating  the two cross—sections.  The 
variable  cspturing  the period  effect, therefore,  is a linear  combination  of 
the cohort variable  and of the years—since-migration  variable.  Cbviously, 
two cross-sections  cannot  be used  to identify three  separate  effects: 
period,  cohort,  and aging effects. 
In order  to estimate  the structural  parameters  describing  the extent  of 
immigrant  assimilation  and cohort  quality change  a restriction  must be 
Imposed on the size  of the period  effect in the  migrant  population.  A 
reasonable,  though  unverifiable,  assumption  is that the period  effect 
experienced  by irtsnigrants  (7,)  is identical  to the period  effect  experience 
by natives (7)  .  In  other  words,  changes  in the wage rate due to shifts in 
aggregate  economic  conditions  affect  the irmnigrant  and native  wage levels by 
the same relative  magnitude.  It is easy  to show  that  this restriction  is 
sufficient  to exactly identify  all the structural  parameters  in  equations 
(26)  and (27) .  This theoretical  restriction  leaves  some amplitude  for its 
empirical  implementation  since  the choice  of the native  base is essentially 
arbitrary.  The choice  of a native  base for the various  irrmigrant groups 
under  study  will be discussed  in detail  below. 
There  are two dimensions  of  migrant  quality that  can be calculated  from 
the estimated  regressions  in (26)  and (27)  :  (a) the entry  wage of immigrants 
when they  arrive  into the United  States; and (b)  the rate at which  this 
wage changes  over  time.  To simplify  the empirical  analysis  the two measures 
will  be combined  into a single  measure of ixmnigrant  quality.  In  particular, 
—20— let .(8) be the entry wage of an ixmsigrant  cohort  that arrives in the 
United  States  at age 20 in calendar  year  8,  and let  be the entry  wage 
of a  comparable  (in terms of all observable  economic  variables)  native 
person  that enters  the labor market  at age 20. Similarly,  let g. be the 
rate at which  the earnings  of irmnigrants  grow  over  their  lifetime,  and 
g  be the growth  rate for natives.  Finally,  let r be the rate  of discount 
(assumed to be the same  for migrants  and natives)  If  persons  are in- 
finitely  lived, the present  values associated  with  the earnings  streams 
of migrants  and natives  are given by: 
—(r—g)t 
V(9)  = 
J (8)e  dt  (8)/(r-g),  (29) 
r  —(r—g)t 
V  e  dt  I(r—g ),  (30) 
n  j  n  n  n 
The percentage  difference  in present  values between  ixtmigrants  of cohort  9 
and natives  is defined  by: 
tn(V(9)/V  )  (Zn ,(e) — Zn  (  — Zn(r—g.J  +  Zn(r—g  ),  (31)  n  n 
and a first—order  approximation  (using the assumption  that earnings 
growth  rates  are small  relative to the discount  rate) yields: 
p 
Zn(V, (9)/V )  (Zn 9,  (8) — Zn Y  )  +  (32) 
1  fl  1  n  r 
Hence  the percentage  difference  in the present value  of the earnings 
streams  faced by imnigrants  and  natives  is an additive  function of the wage 
differential  at the time of entry, and of the difference  in  earnings growth 
—21— rates over the life cycle,8 
The present  value differential  in (32)  oan be easily  evaluated  from  the 
estimates  of equation  (26(  and (27)  if two assumptions  are made.  First, the 
rate of discount  is assumed to be 5 percent.  Clearly,  the assumption  of any 
higher  discount  rate would  lead  to a worsening of relative Immigrant  earnings 
since  the latter  part of  the working  life cycle  (where immigrants  tend  to do 
better)  would be more heavily discounted.  Second, the growth  rates , 
and g 
must  be  evaluated  from  the age and years-since—migration  coefficients  in the 
earnings  functions  in (26)  and (27)  .  The  quadratic  specification  for age and 
years-since-migration  in  the earnings  functions  implies that the growth  rate 
is not constant  over  time.  The empirical  analysis below  will define  the 
growth  rate g. and  g  by: 
= [ J  x,tO,30,8 
j  -  x,20,O,8 
]  )  /30,  (33) 
II  n[ '° 
] 
— n[ X,20  /30,  (34) 
where  Y(X,A,y,8) is the predicted  (Zn)  earnings  for an  immigrant 
with  characteristics  X,  at age A, with y years  of residence  in  the United 
States, and who migrated  in cohort  e.  Similarly,  Yn)XA) gives the predicted 
earnings  for a native  with  characteristics  X at age A.  In  other words,  the 
average growth  rate  experienced  by  immigrants  and natives between  ages 20 and 
50 (evaluated  at the mean  characteristics  of the  migrant  population,  X)  is 
used for estimation  of  the growth  rate in  the present value expressions. 
This  approach  has the useful  property that  the growth  rates  (for both 
immigrants  and natives)  are basically  a linear  function of  regression 
coefficients,  and since the entry wages are given by  Y,(X,20,0,8(  for 
immigrants  and  Y(X,20(  for matives, the  present  value  expressions  in  (33) 
—22— and (34)  ar  also linear  functions  of  regressions  coefficients  and hence a 
standard error can be easily  evaluated. 
This approach marks  a rather  important  departure  from  the empirical 
tradition  in the literature  that analyzes  immigrant earnings.  The entire 
literature  essentially  focuses on the estimation  of  entry wage levels, and  on 
Ite calculation  of "overtaking"  points (if they  exist)  This  type  of 
analysis  is basically  irrelevant  if  overtaking  points  occur  rather  late in 
the life cycle  (or if they  do  not occur  at all) as some recent evidence 
suggests.  The empirical  use of the present value of earnings  is much  more 
consistent  with the theoretical  content  of the theory of migration  and 
deemphasizes  the somewhat misleading  concept of overtaking  points.  The 
analysis  of the success of migrant  groups  in the  United  States, to borrow 
from  the huoan capital theory  that  guided  much  early  research on  immigrant 
earnings,  should  not be based on  the calculation  of wage differentials  at 
given ages,  but on the  life cycle wealth  accumulated by  migrants  and natives. 
Hence the present value  approach  used  in  the empirical  sections of this paper 
is much more in the tradition  of the human  capital literature  and  of the Roy 
model  of immigration developed  in  the previous  section. 
4.  Zarnings  of Iigrants in the  United  States 
4.1.  Data and  Descriptive  Statistics 
This  section analyzes the relative  earnings of  immigrants  in the U.S. 
labor market.  The data  are drawn  from  the 1970 2/100 U.S. Census  (obtained 
by pooling  the 5% SMSA  and  County  Group  Sample  and the 5% State Sample) and 
the 1980  5/100 A  Sample.  The complete  samples are used  in the creation  of 
the immigrant  extracts,  but random  samples are drawn  for the native 
'baseline"  populations.9  The analysis  is restricted to men aged  25-64 who 
satisfied  five sample  selection  rules:  (1)  the individual  was employed  in 
the calendar  year prior  to  the Census;  (2)  the individual  was not self— 
—23— employed  or  working  without  pay;  (3)  the individual was not  in the  Armed 
Forces  (as of the survey  week)  ;  (4)  the individual  did not reside in  group 
iarters; and (5) the individual  reported annual earnings exoeeding  $1000. 
Throughout  this section,  the dependent variable  is the logarithm of the 
individual's  wage rate in the calendar year  prior  to the Census. 
Forty  one countries  were chosen  for analysis.  These  countries  were 
selected on the basis  that both the 1970 and 1980 Censuses  contained a 
substantial  number  of  migrants  from that country.  In particular,  it is 
necessary  to have  at least  80 observations cf  persons born in a particular 
foreign country  in  the pooled  2/100 1970 Census  to enter the sample of  41 
countries.  The countries  thus chosen  account for over 90 percent of  all 
irmigration to the United  States  between 1951 and 1980.  It must  be noted, 
however, that  this restriction  omits some countries which  during  the late 
l970s became  important  source  countries  (e.g., Vietnam)  .  Since two 
Censuses  are reotired  for the complete identification  of the parameters 
of the model  presented  in  Section  3,  hcwever, a systematic  analysis  of 
the relative  earnings  of these  migrants will  have to await the 1990 Census. 
Table  1 begins  the empirical  analysis by presenting  the unstandardired 
differential  between  the log wage rate of the various migrant groups and 
"natives".  In  these  statistics,  the native population  is defined as the 
group  of  U.S. born white,  non-Hispanic,  non-Asian men aged  25-64.  Perhaps 
the most striking  finding  in  the table is the fact that migrants  from 
European  countries  tend  to have  wage  rates that often exceed  the wages  of 
white natives,  while migrants  from Asian or  Latin American  countries  tend  to 
have wage  rates  that  are substantially  below  those of white natives. 
Table  1 also  presents  the relative earnings of  the 1965—1969  cohort cf 
migrants  as of 1970, the relative earnings of the same cohort in  1980, and 
the relative  earnings  of the 1975—1979 cohort as of 1980.  These statistics 
—24— yield  important  insights  into  the process of  assimilation  (the rate  at whicn 
the earnings  of migrants  and nativea are converging)  and into the extent of 
productivity  differences  across  successive  cohorts.  The "tracking"  of  the 
1965—1969  cohort  across  Censuses  shows that  the relative earnings  of this 
cohort of migrants  improved  over  time for most  national  groups.  At the same 
time, the comparison  of successive  issnigrant  cohorts  (i.e., the comparison  of 
the 1965—1969  cohort  as of 1969 and the 1975—1979 cohort as of 1979) shows 
that for some  countries  the relative earnings  of migrants  increased,  while 
for other countries  the relative earnings  of  migrants decreased  substanti- 
ally.  For example,  the  most recent migrant  from  France  in 1970 was earning 
about  8 percent  less  than natives at  the time of entry, while  the most recent 
migrant  from  France  in 1980 was earning  about 22 percent more  than  natives at 
the time  of entry.  Conversely,  the  most recent migrant  from  India in  1970 
earned  about  4  percent more than  white natives at the time  of  entry,  but the 
moat recent migrants  from  India  in  1980 was earning 21 percent  less than 
white  natives  at the time  of  entry. 
Table  2 continues  the descriptive  analysis by presenting  the mean 
(completed)  education  level of four different  cohorts of immigrants  that 
arrived in the 1960—1980  period.  Since the education  data  available  in  the 
Census  does not differentiate  between education  obtained  prior  to 
immigration  and education  obtained  in  the United States after  immigration, 
the mean education  levels  for the 1970—74 and 1975—79 cohorts  are obtained 
from  the 1980 Census,  and the mean  education  levels  for the 1960—64 and 1965— 
69 cohorts  are obtained  from  the 1970 Census.  This use of the available 
data  is designed  to minimize  the contamination  of the education 
variable  by post—migration  schooling. 
The statistics  in  Table  2 are consistent  with  the well-known  secular 
increase  in education  levels over  time  for practically  all migrant  cohorts. 
—25— It is worth noting,  however,  that for some countries  the increase  in 
education  has been quite  small  (e.g.,  Portugal(,  while for other countries 
(e.g., Norway)  it has been  amazingly  large.  As the theoretical  analyais in 
Section  II shows,  these truncated  education means  can only  be understood 
in  terms  of the population  means  of the education  distribution  in  the 
countries  of origin.  To  provide  some insights into the extent of  self— 
selection  on the basis of  education,  Table 2 also presents mean  education 
levels calculated  for the population  in the countries  of origin.  The mean 
education  level for the lSGOs is  calculated  using  enrollment  data in  the 
various countries  of origin  during  the 1950s, while  the mean  education  level 
for the l970s is calculated  using  enrollment  data in  the various countries  of 
origin  during  the l960s.  The "lagged" construction  of the variable giving 
mean  education  levels in  the country  of origin  is designed  to  account for the 
fact that,  in the samples used  here,  the average person  migrated at  age 20. 
The relevant education  distribution,  therefore  is given  by  that of  persons 
enrolled  in school  a few years earlierJ° 
The means in Table 2 present a remarkable  picture.  Even  after allowing 
for the substantial  errors  involved  in calculating  the population means  for each 
country of origin,  the truncated means are almost  always much  greater than 
the population  means.  For example, the mean of  education  in  Haiti  is about 3 
years,  but the most recent Haitian  immigrants  report  10 years of education  in 
the 1980 Census.  Surprisingly,  the two statistics  are most  similar for Mexico, 
where  both  immigrants  and the Mexican  population  have 6-7 years  of education. 
Overall,  Table  2 suggests  that immigrants  are positively  selected on the 
basis of  education.  The model  presented earlier  implies that this result  is 
consistent  with the hypothesis  that the "rate  of return" to  education  is 
greater in the United  States than  in  most countries  of  origin.11 
—26— 4.2.  Basic Regression  Results 
The regression  model in equations  (26)  and (27)  was estimated  on each of 
the 41 countries  under analysis using  the pooled  1970  and 1980 Census  data. 
As noted  earlier,  the choice  of the native  baseline  is an  important  step in 
the estimation  procedure.  In this section,  the reference  group  is chosen 
according  to the race/ethnic  background  of the population  of each country  of 
origin.  The estimation  uses  the white,  non—Hispanic,  non—Asian  sample  of 
native  men as the reference  group  for migrants  from  Europe, Canada,  and the 
Middle  East.  The group  of Asian  natives  is the reference  group  for migrants 
from all other  Asian  countries.  The group of Mexican  natives  is the 
reference  group for Mexiran  migrants,  and the group  of "other Hispanic"  men 
is the reference  group for persons  from  all other Spanish—speaking  countries 
in the American  continent.  Finally,  the group  of  black natives  is the 
reference  group for migrants  from  countries  with predoninantly  black 
populations  (i.e., Haiti,  Jamaica,  and Trinidad  and  Tobago). 
The definition  of the reference  group in terms of  the racial/ethnic 
baokground  of the  irrsnigrant  population  is a simple  way of specifying 
different  period  effects  for the various  itisnigrant groups.  Presumably,  the 
impact  of changes  in aggregate  economic  conditions  on  irrmigrant  earnings  is 
likely  to be better  approximated  by the period  effects experienced  by 
populations  which  closely  resemble  the inroigrant  group.  It is important  to 
note,  however,  that although  che baseline  populations  differ  across  the 41 
countries,  the calculation  of the present value  differentials  defined  in 
equation (32)  will always  be relative  to  white,  non—Hispanic,  non—Asian 
natives (as in Table 1)  .  In other  words,  the use of  alternative  reference 
groups  is simply  used to "net out" the period  effect  in the 1980 Census,  and 
after  controlling  for period  effects all comparisons  between migrants  and 
natives  are conducted  with respect  to the "white" population. 
—27— The calculated  present  value differentials  estimated  from  the 41 runs of 
the model are presented  in Table 3  for each of the 6 cohorts  identifiable  in 
the Census  data.  it is worth  stressing  that these present  value 
differentials  measure  the differences  in earnings  among migrants  and  white 
natives  of equal  measured  skills, and hence are empirical  counterparts  to the 
quality  measure Q  defined  in terms  of unobserved  characteristics. 
Table 3 shows  that  there  are substantial  differences  in  the "abilities"  of 
migrant  groups  aoross  the 41 countries  of  origin.  Immigrsnts  from European 
countries  (particularly  Western European  countries)  tend to do otite  well 
relative  to white  natives of comparable  socioeconomic  characteristics. 
Recent  immigrants  from  the U.K.,  for example,  can expect  about  10 percent 
larger earnings over  their  lifetime  than comparable  white  natives;  recent 
immigrants  from France will  earn  about  8—19 percent more then  comparable 
white  natives;  and recent  immigrants  from  Sweden  will  earn  about  10—20 
percent  more than  white  natives  over  their  lifetime. 
On the other  hand,  immigrants  from  most Asian and Latin Amerioan 
countries  do not perform  well in  comparison  to  white natives  of equal 
observable  skills.  Recent  immigrants  from  Taiwan,  for example,  will  earn 
about  16-34  percent  less over their lifetime than comparable  white  natives; 
immigrants  from Israel will  earn  about  20—30 percent less than whites; 
immigrants  from  Argentina  will  earn  about 20 percent  less than  whites, and 
immigrants  from  Coloia  will earn about 24-38 percent  less  than comparable 
whites.  An immi.grant's  birthplace  plays an important  role  in determining  the 
type  of selection  that characterizes  the migrant  flow. 
In  addition,  Table  3 shows that  even  within  a given  country of origin 
there  are sizable  differences  in  the unobserved  quality  of immigrants  across 
the various  cohorts.  The quality of immigrants  from  some countries  has been 
increasing  rapidly,  while the quality of immigrants  from  other  countries  has 
—28— been  declining rapidly.  For instance,  the most recent French  immigrants  have 
a higher  earnings  potential  than  earlier  cohorts  (particularly  those  arriving 
before 1970), while the most recent Polish  migrants  have  much lower earnings 
potential  than migrants  of earlier cohorts.  Similarly,  the most recent 
Canadian  immigrants  earn about  8—15 percent  more  than  most of  the earlier 
cohorts,  while the most  recent  Mexican  inraigrants earn  about  9—13 percent 
less than the earlier  Mexican  cohorts.1 
4.3. Determinants  of Selectiom  in Unobserved  Characteristics 
The Roy model suggests  that  the quality  differentials  documented  in Table  3 
ran be flexpiained  by economic  and  political  characteristics  of both the vsricus 
countries  of origin  end the United  States at  the time  of  migration. 
Because it is easier  to obtain such  data  for the post-1960  period,  and 
also to maintain  comparability  with  the analysis  that  will  be conducted  in 
the next section  across  nost countries,  the empirical  study  in this 
section  focuses  in explaining  the variation  in  quality across  the four 
cohorts  that arrived  in the post-1960  period  Hence  there are 164 
observations  (41  countries  times  4 cohorts  per country)  in the data set 
analyzed  here.  The aggregate  variables  used in  the analysis,  for the most 
part,  are obtained  from  my earlier study (sorjas, 1987) and are described  in 
Table  5.  They include measures  of political  conditions  in  the country 
of origin,  mobility  costs, and characteristics  of the income distribution 
(the mean and the variance) 
The empirical  analysis  of the differences  in  the present value 
differentials  between  immigrants  and natives in the 164 observation  data  set 
is presented in Table 5. The first column  of the table presents  estimates 
of the reduced—form  equation  derived  in (11)  .  This  regression  reveals  that a 
relatively  small  number  of  country-specific  variables  explains a  large 
fraction  of the inter-and  intra-country  variance  in the unobserved  quality 
—29— of immigrants  Many of the aggregate  characteristics  are statistically 
significant.  Consider,  for inatance,  the variable measuring  the  extent of 
income  inequality  in the country  of  origin.  The coefficient  of this variable 
is negative  and  marginally  significant,  as predicted  by  the theory. 
Similarly,  the difference  between  mean  GNP in  the country of origin  and 
mean GNP in the U.S.  is positive  and significant,  indicating  the fact that 
migrants from  countries  with  advanced  economies are characterized  by 
larger  levels of unobserved  abilities  or productivities. 
It is worth  stressing  that the measure  of income inequality  is not only 
statistically  significant,  but also  has a sizable numerical  impact on  the 
quality  of the immigrant  flow.  This point is best illustrated by 
considering  two countries:  the United  Kingdom  and Mexico.  The inequality 
measure  takes on a value  of 4.0 for the U.K.  and of 12.3 for Mexico.  The 
regression  coefficient  in Table 5 suggests that, holding  all other factors 
constant,  Mexican  immigrants  earn 3—4 percent  less than  Eritish  immigrants 
simply  because  of the selectivity  effects of higher  levels of income 
inequality. 
Three other  variables  seem to be  quite  important  in  the regression.  The 
first measures  the English proficiency  of the immigrant  pool.  Immigrants 
from  countries  wher  English  is prevalent  do much  better  in the U.S.  than 
immigrants  from  non—English—speaking  countries.  Second, the unemployment 
rate in the U.S.  is an important  determinant  of immigrant quality:  The 
higher  the unemployment  rate  at the time  of  migration,  the better  the 
quality  of the migrant  pool.  This result  is consistent  with the Roy  model if 
unemployment  particularly  affects the earnings  opportunities  of low—skilled 
workers.  For instance,  an increase  in  the unemployment  rate  will worsen  the 
opportunities  for persons  in the lower end of  the ability  (i.e.,  income) 
distribution,  and hence will lead  to reduced incentives  for these  persons to 
—30— migrate.  The quality of  the self-selected  ixmaigrant  pool increases  as  a 
result  of the withdrawal  from  the "immigrant  market" of these  persons. 
Finally,  the reduced  form  regression  in Table 5 introduces  a duxmrty 
variable  signaling  whether  the cohort  arrived  in the post—1970  period. 
Recall  that  U.S. ixmmigration  policy  was changed  drastically  by the 1965 
Amendments (which became  fully effective  in 1968)  .  Hence pnst-1968  cohorts, 
holding constant  characteristics  of the country of  origin,  should  have 
significantly  lower  earnings  than  earlier  cohorts.  This  is precisely  what 
the results  in Table  5 indicate.  In particular,  post-1970  cohorts  have 
nearly  16 percent  lower  (relative) earnings  over  the life cycle  than 
immigrants  who arrived  prior  to the change in  U.S. policy.  This result 
provides  striking  evidence  of  a significant  structural  shift that  occurred  in 
the unobserved  quality  of  U.S.  immigrants  in  the last two decades.  This 
change  may well be due to the fact that occupational  and skill  requirements 
were deemphasired  by the 1965 Amendments,  and that family  reunification  was 
made the primary goal of U.S. immigration  policy. 
As noted earlier,  since data  exists  on the emigration  rate  of 
irmnigrants from any given country  of origin (i.e.,  the number  of immigrants 
in a particular  cohort,  and the population  of the country of origin  at the 
time of  migration),  the selectivity  variable  k can be  calculated,  and 
the structural equation in  (12)  can be estimated.  The  structural equation  is 
written  as  =  h?  and  the h function can be approximated by h  = 
where  I is the vector of variables  proxying for the relevant primitive 
parameters.  Hence  the empirical  counterpart  to (12)  is Q,  = (ZX( 
This structural equation is presented in the  second  column of  Table 5.  The 
selectivity variabie  directly controls for changes  in mobility costs  anc 
means  of  income distributions and these variables  are omatted 
from  the structural  regression.  Remarkably,  the structural  equation  leads  to 
—31— estimates  that are highly  significant  and very  supportive  of the Roy model. 
In  particular,  the ineality  variable becomes negative  and very significant, 
the unemploment variable  retrains  pcaitive and significant,  and the dummy 
variable indexing  post—1970  cohorts  remains negative  and strong. 
The estimated  regression  parameters  can  be used  to calculated  h = z. 
The estimates  of h are presented  at the bottom  of column  2  in Table  6.  Three 
estimates  are presented:  one evaluated  at the  mean of all the variables,  a 
second  one evaluated  at the same  means but letting the dummy  variable  UStAW 
index  pre-1970  cohorts,  and a third evaluated  at the same  means  but letting 
the dummy  variable  USLAW index post-1970  cohorts.  These  simulations  show 
that there  seemed  to be weak  positive  selection prior  to 1970,  but very 
strong  negative  selection  in the post-1970  period. 
4.4.  teterminants  of Seleotiom  in Education 
As noted  earlier,  self-selection  occurs not only  on the basis  of 
unobserved  ability,  but also  on the basis of observed characteristics  such 
as education.  Table  2 documented  that there  are strong  differences  in 
educational  attainment  across  immigrant  groups from  different  countries.  In 
addition,  it was seen  that  the observed  educational attainment  of immigrant 
groups  differed  from  the mean educational  attainment  of the population  in the 
country  of origin.  It is of interest, therefore,  to analyre  whether  the same 
variables  that detemmine  the extent  of  differences  in unobserved  char- 
acteristics  can also explain  the differences  in  educational  attainment 
across  immigrant  groups. 
Table 6 presents  the regressions  attempting  to estimate  equations  (24) 
and (25)  using  the 164 observations  for all four post—1960  cohorts.  Consider 
the reduced  foum  regression  in the first column  of the table.  Many  of the 
variables  are stetistioally  significant,  and the regression  has a relatively 
high  explanatory  power:  the few variables  included  in the regression 
—32— explain  nearly  two thirds  of the educational  attainment  differential  across 
io'migranta cohorts.  It is worth noting  that the political  variables  have 
significant  positive  impacts  on  the level of educational  attainment  of 
immigrants.  Individuals  from  countries  with  politically  competitive  parties, 
from communist  countries,  or from  countries  that recently  lost their 
freedom  all have  higher  educational  attainment  (relative  to countries  that 
are not cormounist and that are not politically  competitive) 
-  It is also 
worth  noting  that distance  from  the IhS. has a positive  impact on  educational 
attainment.  This is what wouid be expected  if there  is positive  selection  in 
education. As distance  increases  the emigration  rate declines-  Since fewec 
persons  migrate,  and since there  is positive  selection,  the mean  educatconai 
attainment  increases.  cn the other  hand,  the ON? variable  implies the 
opposite,  since  it has a negative  impact on  educational  attainment.  As ON? 
in  the country  of origin  increases  (relative to  the USJ the migration  rate 
should  also decline,  and if there  is positive  selection  in  education  the 
educational  attainment  of migrants  should  increase-  The reduced form 
regression  in Table 6 contradicts  this  prediction. 
Finally,  the regression  shows  that the mean level of  educational 
attainment  in the country  of origin  has a positive  impact on the  mean 
educational  attainment  of  immigrants,  and that  the coefficient,  as predicted, 
is between  0 and 1.  This  confirmation  of the theory,  however, should  be 
treated  with some  caution  since  the mean education  level  in  the country of 
origin  is measured  with substantial  error. 
The second  column in  Table  6 presents  the structurai  regression  on the 
truncated  mean of the education  distribution  (see equation  (25)) -  One 
interesting  experiment  that can be conducted  with  the structural  estimates  is 
to predict  the coefficient  of  X, as  in  Table 5.  This prediction  (at the mean 
ievei of the variable in the regression) is presented in  the last row of the 
—33-- table  and is seen  to be positive  and significant.  There  seems to  be, 
therefore,  aignifioant  positive selection in  the educational  attainment  of 
irrmigrants.  Note that the USIAW  coefficient  is insignificantly  different 
from zero.  This implies that the positive selection  found  in  educational 
attainment  was  unaffected  by the changes  in policy  associated  with  the 1965 
Amencments. 
5.  Ixigrant Sorting Across Host Countries 
The  last section  showed that the labor market performance of  issnigranta 
currently  living in the U.S.  is strongly influenced by economic  and political 
characteristics of the country of origin at the time of migration.  Potential 
emigrants  in the source  countries,  however,  chose to come  to the United 
States  instead of migrating to other potential countries of destination.  In 
a  sense,  the observed  pool of irmigrants  in  the U.S. is the outcome of 
competition  in  the "irrmigrant  market'  among various  countries  of destination. 
Different  countries,  by offering  different  ixzsnigraticn  policies  and different 
income  distributions,  wil_ attract different  kinds of inigranta. 
As noted  earlier,  three  countries,  Australia,  Canada,  and the United 
States,  have been  the main countries  of  destination  for permanent  migranta  in 
recent  years.  Each  of theae  countries,  of course, is characterized  by  a long 
history  of irrmigraticn.  The size  of the recent  flows generated  by the self- 
selection  of irrsnigranta  into  each  of the three potential  countries  of 
destination  is illustrated  in Table 7.  Over the 1959—81 period,  about  14.7 
million  persons  legally  left  the various countries  of origin  and migrated  to 
either  Australia,  Canada,  or the United  States.  Sixty  percent  of these 
migrants  chose  the United  States  as their destination,  and the remainder were 
evenly  split  between  Australia  and Canada.  Table 7 also shows that these 
statistics  vary significantly  between the early part  of the period (1959-70), 
and the later  part  of the period (1971-81)  .  Recent  migrants  are 
—34— disproportionately  more likely  to  select  the 0.5.  as their destinaton 
(nearly two thirds  of migrants  in  the 197  Os chose  to do  so)  ,  and 
disproportionately  less likely  to choose  Australia  as therr destination  (only 
14 percent  did so) 
These  aggregate  statistics  mask important country—of-origin  differences. 
During the 1971—91  period,  the US.  was less likely to attract  immigrants 
from  Africa,  the United  Kingdom,  and Europe, and significantly  more likely to 
attract  immogrants  from  Asia  or North and South America  Canada,  on  the 
other  hand,  seemed  a relatively  attractive  destination  for irmzigrsnts from 
Africa,  the U.K.  and Europe, while Australia  was the destination  of  choice 
for persons  anigratong  the United  Kingdom:  Nearly half  of the 2 million 
persons  who left  the U.K.  in the 1959-1981 period  migrated  to Australia S4 
5,1.  Migration  Policies  in Most  Countries 
One important  constraint  on the size  and the composition  of the flow  of 
mIgrants to potential host  countries is the set of statutes and policies  used 
by the various countries to screen  the applicant pool.  U.S.  immigration 
policy,  prior to the  1965  Amendments  to  the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
was  guided  by  the  objective  of restricting  the migration  of persons  whose 
national  origin  did not resemble  the national origin  and ethnic  composition 
of the United  States  population  in 1919.  The 1965 Amendments  abolished  the 
"discriminatory"  national  origin  quota  system, and instituted  the goal  of 
family  reunification  as the main objective  of U.S. immigration  policy.  Tnese 
changes,  as we saw above, may have been responsible  for a very large  decline 
in the unobserved skills of  immigrants admitted by  the United  States. 
Canadian  immigration  policy,  until  1961, also  had a preferential 
treatment  of immigrants  originating  in  Western European  countries.  The 1962 
Immigration  Act (and further  relatively  minor  changes  in the statutes  and 
regulations  through  the l970a) removed  the country—of-origin  and racial 
—35— restrictions,  and shifted emphasis towards  skill  rewioements.  Under  the new 
regulations,  potential  migrants  who were not relatives  of Canadian  citizens 
or residents  could  enter  Canada  if ohey  passed  a "teat"  -  Applicants were 
graded  and given  up to  100 points  according  to a "point  system",  and 50 
points  were  necessary  to obtain  permission  to migrate  to  Canada.  These 
points  were  given according  to  the applicant's  education  (a point  per year  of 
schooling,  up to 20  points)  ,  occupational  demand (10 points  if the 
applicant's  occupation  was in strong  demand  in  Canada), age )up to 10 points 
for applicants  under  the age of 35,  minus  1 point  for each year  over  age 35), 
a "personal  assessment"  by the irmsigration  officer that  was valued  up to 15 
points,  etc.  In  1976,  the Canadian  Irigration Act was amended  to 
incorporate  the goal of family  reunification  as an important policy 
objective. 
Australian  lrmLigratson  policy  has a long  history of restricting the 
migration  of persons  who are not of British origin.  These  restrictions, 
known  as the "white  Australia  Policy",  operated  both in  terms  of denying 
entry  to persons  of  non—British  or  non—Northern  European origin,  and also in 
terms  of denying  financial  assistance  (to  cover  transportation  and 
resettlement  expenses)  to  undesirable  migrants. 
World  War II raised  doubts  among Australian  officials  about the 
feasibility  of defending  a large continent  with  a small population,  and a 
series  of governments  pursued  a national policy  of  substantially  increasing 
the nuxer of irmigrants  who chose Australia  as their destination.  This 
objective,  however,  could  not be achieved by only  allowing the migration  of 
British  citizens,  and thus  Australia  began  looking elsewhere  for migrants 
(e.g., Germany,  the Netherlands,  Malta,  Italy and Greece  all signed  formal 
arrangements  with  the Australian  government  to recruit and assist persons 
from  these  countries  in  their migration  to  Australia) .  Further political 
—36— changes  in Australia  led to  the abolishment  of the White  Australoa  Policy  on 
1972.  An immigration  policy  devoid  of  discrimination  by  national  origin and 
cace was announced,  and a point  system  based  on the Canadian  system  was 
instituted.  During  the early  l980s, Australia  began  to  stress  the concept  of 
family  reunification  in its migration  policy (see Sirrell,  1983)  -  It is 
unlikely,  however,  that this shift  in  policy  will have much impact on  the 
1981 Australian  Census  data that will  be analyzed  below. 
The impact of tnese changes  in  immigration  policy  on  the national orogin 
composition  of the immigrant pool in each  of  the countries  is  documented  in 
Table  8.  In all hoat countrlsa,  the national  ocigin  of the immigrant 
population  has changed  drastocally  ovec time.  For example,  in both  Canada 
and the U.S.,  the share of migrants  originating  in European  countries 
declined  drastocally  between  the 1963s and l970a.  During  the l960a, 23.5 
percent  of immigrants  to Canada  originated  in  the United  Kingdom,  and an 
additoonal  46.7 percent  originated  in other European  countries.  During  the 
1970s,  the respective  fractiona  had fallen  to 15.2 end 21.7 percent, 
respectively.  Conversely,  the fraction of immigrants  originating  in  Aaia was 
only 8.4 percent  during  the 1960s, and this fraction had increased  to 29.1 
percent  ducing  the l970a. 
Table 8  snows that the U.K.  accounted  for nearly  half  of  the migranta  to 
Australia  durong  the lGOs,  but only for a third  of the migrants  during  the 
l970a.  A similar decline  is observed in the fraction of Australian 
immigrants  originating  in other  European  countries:  from  40.8 percent  to 
22.4  percent.  On the other  hand, the fraction  of immigrants  from Asia 
increased  from 5.3 to 21.1  percent,  a fourfold  Increase  in  a 10 year period. 
5.2.  Data and  Descriptive  Statistics 
The data are drawn  from  Census  Public  Use Samples available  for each of 
the three  destination  countries.  The U.S. data is identical  to that  used in 
—37— the previous  sectaon,  and reuires  no further description. 
The Canadian  Censuses  were conducted  in  1971 and 1981.  Both  of these 
Censuses  have  the important  characteristic  that  they  report  the year in which 
foreign—born  persons  arrived  in  Canada.  Hence  the aging/cohort  decomposition 
described  in Section  3 can be carried out.  The 1971 data for both iossigrants 
and natives  residing  in Canada  is a 1/100 rsndom  sample of  the Canadia 
population,  while  the 1981  micro  file is a 2/100  random  sample of  the 
Canadian  population.  All observations  that satisfy the sample  restriction  of 
being  prime-age  men (aged 25-64),  not self-employed,  not residing  in  group 
quarters,  and whose  records  report positive  annual earnings  in the year  prior 
to the Census are used in  the analysis. 
The Australian  data used in this  paper  are drawn  from  the 1981 Census  of 
Population  and Housing,  the only  micro  Australian  Census  file available  at 
present.  This  Census  file is a 1/100 random  sample of  the Australian 
population,  and the entire  sample  (for both iiigrants and natives)  that 
satisfies  the sample  restrictions  listed above  is used. 
Three  important  problems  are raised by  the Australian  data.  First, only 
one Census is available  and, therefore,  the aging/cohort  decomposition  cannon 
be  conducted.  The Australian  results, therefore,  are not directly  comparable 
to those  for the other  two countriea.  Nevertheless,  a simple  solution that 
allows  some  rough  comparisons  will be proposed below,  Second,  the Australian 
Census  does not report  annual earnings,  but instead reports  annual  incomes 
)whirh inolude non—salary  receipts)  .  This problem  may not be very serious 
since  the analysis  focuses on native/imigrant  earnings  differences,  end 
self—employed  persons  are umitted  from  the study.  Finally,  the Australian 
Census (unlike the U.S.  or Canadian data) does  not contain  good  measures 
of labor  supply. Hence a wage rate for the year  prior  to the Census  cannot 
be calculated.  The empirical  analysis  in  this section, therefore,  will be 
—38— conducted  on the logarithm  of annual  earnings.  Tt is important  to note, 
however,  that the analysis  for both the U.S. and Canada was  replicated 
using the wage  rate as the dependent  variable,  with  little  change  in the 
otalitative  nature  of the results. 
Table 9  presents  surwtary  statistics  (mean earnings  and education)  as well 
as sample  sires  for the various samples  that will be used  in  the analysisS6 
In  addition,  Table  9 decomposes  the immigrant population  in each  of  the host 
countries  according  to the continent  of origin.  This  decomposition  by 
continent (rather than  country)  is mandated  by the fact that  in both the 
Australian  and Canadian  Censuses  the decomposition  by country leads to a very 
small nuer  of observations  for most  countries.  In  addition,  the Canadian 
Censuses  identify  the country of origin  only for a select group  of Western 
European smaigrants. 
The results for  the United States,  as expected,  show a downward trend 
in the earnings  of  immigrants (relative to natives) over the decade.  Tne 
average  immigrant  in 1970 earned, on average, about  as much as the typical 
native  wor:Cer.  By  1930,  however,  immigrant  earnings were  about  15  percent 
below the native  wage.  The Canadian  data show little  change in the rela- 
tive earninga  of ixrmigrants  between  1971 and 1981.  Tn both Censuses,  the 
average  immigrant  had slightly  higher  earnings than the typical  native 
worker.  The exception  seems to be immigrants  originating in Latin Pmerioa; 
their  earnings  are about  10 percent  lower than  those of Canadian  natives  in 
1971,  but 19  percent  lower in 1981.  The Australian  Census  shows  that  the 
typical  immigrant  in 1981 had roughly the same earnings  as the typical native 
person,  and that the differential  varied  somewhat by country  of  origin. 
Tt is instructive  to compare the Australian  statistics  with the 
relevant  numbers  for Canada  end the U.S.  For instance,  European  immigrants 
in Australia  actually  have  the lowest  education  levels  of any of the migrant 
—39—. groups  in  Australia,  and have  a wage disadvantage  of only 5 percent.  In 
Canada,  European  immigrants  also  tend  to have slightly lower  educational 
levels, but higher  eernings  than  natives, while  in  the U.S.  Eurocean 
immigrants  outperform all other immigrant  groups despite the fact that they 
have lower educational levels than the native population.  This comparison 
(as  well as similar  comparisons  for other  regions of origin) reveals the non— 
random  sorting  of migrants across  the various host  countries. 
An important  insight  is provided  by these statistics:  Generalizations 
about  the productivity  or  earnings  capacities  of  ethnic or national  groups 
are misleading  sinre they ignore the self-selectivity  that generated  the 
composition  of the migrant pool in  each of the  host countries.  In  other 
words, there  is no such  thing  as "the" impeot  of  Asian ethnicity  or race on 
immigrant  esrnings.  The value  attached  by the host  country's  labor market  00 
ethnic/racial  characteristics  depends greatly  on  the kinds  of  selections  ohao 
generated  the particular  flow  of  migrants. 
5.3.  1980-81 Cross-Section  Regressions 
Since  the aging/cohort  decomposition  cannot be  conducted  for the 
Australian  data,  it is instructive to begin  the empirical  analysis by 
focusing  on the 1980—81  cross—section.  Table  10 presents  cross—section 
earnings  function  estimated  separately  in  the samples of  immigrants  and 
natives  in each of  the three countries  of destination.  The regressions  in 
the native  samples  are of  interest mainly  because  they  are so similar  across 
the destination  countries.  The coefficients  of  age, marital  status, and 
urbanization  status  all have the expected  signs and are of similar magnitudes 
whether  the labor market is in Australia,  Canada, or the United  States.  The 
only  coefficient  that seems to be an outlier in the native  samples  is that of 
education  in  Australia,  where  the coefficient  is almost  twice  as large as 
that in the U.S. or  Canada. 
—40— The  regressions  in the immigrant  samples are interesting  because  they 
illustrate  the general  result  that practically  all socioeconomic  variables 
have a smaller  impact  among immi.grants  than among natives  regardless  of  the 
country  of destination.  The earnings  of irtsrtigcants  are much less responsive 
to socioeconomic  characteristics  than  the earnings  of  natives  in these 
economies. 
The immigrant  regressions  in Table 10 also include a vector  of  variables 
indicating  the time  of  migration.1  An important  use of these coefficients 
(and of the socioeconomic  variables)  is to predict the size  of the wage 
differentials  between  immigrants  and natives  for each of the cohorts.  These 
predictions  are calcalated  ising the mean socioeconomic  characteristics  of 
the immigrant  sample in each  of the host  oountrres.  In addition,  these 
predictions  ace obtained  by  holding the age of immigration  constant at age 20 
for all cohocts  Hence  the typical immigrant  in  the 1975—1980  cohort  is 23 
years old when  the predictron is calculated,  the  typical  immigrant  in  1970-74 
is  28 years  old, etc.  The predicted  age/earnings  profile,  therefore, 
incorporates  both aging  and cohort  effects.  These profiles  are presented  in 
Table 11. 
The U.S.  and Canadian  profiles  resemble the ones  usually  reported  in the 
literature:  The earlier  cohorts, either  because  they  are older and have  oeen 
in the country longer,  or because there are vintage or  cohort  effects,  do 
much better  in the labor market than  more recent cohorts.  Table  11, however, 
shows  that the Australian  experience  is very  different.  The Australian 
cross-section  age/earnings  profile  for immigrants  is essentially  flat!  In 
fact,  it is impossible  to find  any statistical  difference  in the relative 
earnings  of immigrants  among  the cohorts  that  arrived  in  Australia  after 
1950.  Their relative  earnings  hover  around  7-8 percent  less  than natives, 
and there  is no discernible  trend over time.  This result  implies  that  if 
—41— there  is any assimilation  effect in  Australia  the quality  of imaigrants  to 
Australia  must have increased  in the 1960—80 period.  Hence a simple 
comparison  of the cross-section  regressions  acrcss the destination  countries 
leads  to an important  finding ebout  the trends that  mark the self—selection 
of irmnigrant flows  to  the host countries  over  the last two decades. 
5.4.  Present  Value Differentials 
Sinoe  two Censuses  are required  to identify aging  and cohort  effects,  the 
analysis  of  equations  (26)  and  (27)  is initially  restricted  to the U.S.  and 
Canadian  Censuses.  Within  each country  of  destination,  five  insnigrant 
samples  will  be analyzed:  the pooled  sample, and the subsamples  of 
imzsigrants originating  in  Africa, Asia,  Europe  and Latin  America.  These 
regressions  are used  to  calculate  the present value differential  between 
immigrants  and natives  for each  of the cohorts.  These  present  value 
differentials  are presented  in Table 12.  (The date presented  in Table 12 too 
Australia  will  be discussed  in detail  below) 
Consider initially the pooled  sample of immigrants.  Table 12 documents 
the systematic  decline  in the quality of iigrsnts arriving  in the U.S.  over 
the lest two decades.  For instance, the typical  imaigrent  arriving  in i0E0 
64 in the U.S.  hed only  a slight wage  disadvantage  relative to a compsoshie 
native,  while  the typical issnigrent  arriving  in  the U.S.  in 1975—1979  has a 
wage disadvantage  of nearly  27 percent  over  the life  cycle  as compared  to the 
native  baseline.  Remarkebly,  the Canadian  Censuses  reveals very similar 
patterns:  The 1960—64 migrant  to Canada  has a 6 percent  wage disadvantage 
over the life cycle  (relative to  natives)  ,  while  the disedventege  for the 
most recent  migrants (1975—80) has  increased to nearly  23 percent. 
The Ameriren  and Canadian  trends  are less similar when  the analysis  is 
restricted  to men from  a specific  country of  origin.  For example,  among 
European  immigrants,  the U.S. Census  reveals a substentiel  decline  in quali:y 
—42— (from a 4 percent  advantage  to an 11  percent disadvantage)  over  the last 
twenty  years,  while  the Canadian  Census  reveals a roughly stable  wage 
differential  between  immigrants  and natives over  the post—1960  cohorts. 
Similarly  among Asian immigrants,  the Canadian  data  reveals  that  the 1960-64 
cohort  and the  1975-80  cohort  had essentially the  same  relative standing, 
white  the U.S  data reveals  a  decline in quality from  a  15 percent 
disadvantage  to a  27  percent  disadvantage.  These  results, therefore,  imply 
that at least part of the similarity between  the  U.S.  and  Canada  at the 
aggregate  level is due  to the  fact that the  nationai origin composition  of 
the cohorts shifted over time,  away  from European  immigrants  (who  tend to  do 
quite well in the  labor market)  to Asian and  tatin American immigrants  (who 
do  much worse in  the  labor market( 
As  noted  earlier,  the Australian  Census  is only  available  for 1981. 
Since cohort  and  aging effects cannot be  identified,  the present value 
differentials cannot be calculated directly.  Recall,  however, that the  1981 
cross—section  regressions estimated  in  the Australian data  showed  that 
immigrants  in Australia face  signcfcantly different age/earnings  profiles 
than their counterparts in the  U.S.  and Car.ada.  In particular,  in  the  cross— 
section,  there seers  to be little relationship  between  the earnings  of 
immigrants  in Australia and  the  length of residence  in Australia.  If tnere 
is ai  assimilation  effect in Australia,  therefore,  this result must  imply 
that the  quality of  immigrants  to Australia  has  increased  over the last  two 
or  three decades. 
A rough estimate of this increase  can  be  obtained if it is assumed that 
the  unobserved assimilation  effect experienced by immigrants  in  Australia 
reseles the  assimilation  effect of similar (i.e.,  persons from the same 
country of origin)  persons  in  Canada  or the United States.  Given  thcs 
approximation,  the  assimilation effects cam  then be subtracted from the 
—43— Australian  cross—  section  coefficients  (thus netting  out the role played  by 
pure  aging in the generation  of the croas-section  resulta),  and the present 
value differentials  can be computed  for each  of the cohorts.  Since  there  are 
two sets  of assimilation  parameters  (one for Canada  and one for the U.S.), a 
number  of different  approximations  can be  calculated,  in  general,  these 
experiments  led to aimilar  qualitative  findings.  in this paper,  therefore, 
the assimilation  rate used  is  the average of the two assimilation  ratea 
(i.e., the U.S.  and Canada  aging effects) experienced  by ironigranta from  the 
same continent  of  origin. 
Given  theae  assimilation  rates, and the cross—section  regressions 
estimated  in the Australian  Census  for each region of  origin,  it is a simple 
matter  to calculate  the predicted  present value differential  between the 
various cohorts  of i.migrants  and comparable  natives  in  Australia.  These 
predictions  are also presented  in  Table  12.  Two substantive  results are 
worth  noting.  As implied by  the flat earnings  profiles  found  in  the  (pocled( 
Australian  cross—section,  the quality of irigrsnts to Australia  increased 
slightly  over the last  20—30  years.  The typical  ironigrant in 1960—64 could 
expect  a 7 percent  wage disadvantage  over his life  cycle,  while  the typical 
irroigrant  in 1975—80 has no wage  disadvantage  relative to natives over  his 
life cycle.  Second, this increase in  irmsigranr  quality  can essentially  be 
found in every one of the national  origin groups  under  analysis.  For 
example,  the typical European  ixmnigrant  in  the early l960s had a 7  percent 
wage disadvantage,  while the typical European  irroigrant in the late l970s has 
a 7 percent  wage advantage  over  natives.  Similarly,  the average Asian 
ironigrant  in the early  SOs had 24 percent  lower earnings  over  his life cycle 
than natives,  while  the differential  is only  6 percent (and insignificant) 
for the most recent  migrants. 
The data  presented  in  Table 12 provides  a unique  descriptive  analysis ct 
—44— an important  question:  which host  countries  are the "winners"  and the "losers" 
in the immigration  rrket?  This comparison,  of  course, depends  on the 
assumption  that the native  base across countries  has a similar  level of 
productivity  and skills.  This assumption  makes  the relative wage  of 
insoigranta across  host  countries  directly  comparable  as am index of immigrant 
quality.  The assumption  that natives among  the three host  countries  are 
roughly  similar  is not empirically  verifiable-  However,  it does 
not seem unreasonable  since all three  countries  share  a coosnon  language, 
culture,  political  and economic systems,  and are at similar  stages  of 
economic  development. 
Given this assumption,  the statistics presented in Table 12 present an 
interesting story  of the extent of self—selection in the generation of the 
foreign—born population  in each  of the countries.  Consider  the trends  for 
the pooled  sample.  During  the 1940s and ISSOs, Australia  was attracting 
immigrants  who had lower productovitles  than  the xnnigrants  attracted  oy Canada 
and the U.S.  This  tyoe of selection,  however,  was  drastically reversed 
during the lStOs,  as  both Canada and the U.S. began to  attract persons  who 
did not perfonr  as well in the labor market,  and Australia  began  to attract 
with relatively  high levels of unobserved  seolls. 
As noted  earlier,  it is somewhat surprising  that  the cohort  quality 
trends in Canada  and the United  States  are so similar despite the major 
differences  in immigration policies  that  exist  between  the two countries. 
Immigration  policies,  however,  can only screen  applicants  on the basis  of 
observed  economic  characteristics  such as education,  occupation,  and age. 
The results  summarized  in  Table  12 show  that even stringent  "point  system" 
policies (such as that  of  Canada(  have only  a relatively  small impact  on the 
selections  in unobserved  characteristics  that  generate  the immigrant  flow. 
—45— 5.5.  Determinants  of Iljalit 
Consider  the following  regression  model: 
Q. . (t)  = X.  (t)a + X,  (t( + s  )t)  (35)  1J  1  3  1) 
where  0(t) is the present  value differential  between  iiumigrants end  netives 
of a cohort  migrating  from  country  i to country  j  at time  t; X is a vector  of 
variables  describing  conditions  in the country of origin  i at time t;  and 
X,)t)  is a vector  of  variables  describing  conditions  in  the country  of 
destination  j  at time t. 
The specification  of (35)  builds  in a very  important  (and restrictive) 
assumption.  In  particular,  the relative earnings of s person  from country  i 
in country  j  at time t is independent  of  events in  other periods  t'  (tt'), 
and  more importantly  it is also  independent  of  conditions  in other  countries 
(particularly  it is independent  of  conditions  in other potential  countries  of 
destination)  .  This  empirical  framework,  in  a sense, introduces  an 
independence  of irrelevant  alternatives"  assumption  into  the study. 
Although  this assumption  is not likely to be strictly satisfied,  it does 
simplify  the empirical  analysis  greatly,  If the assumption  was invalid, fo 
instance,  the right—hand  side  of )35)  would have  to be expanded  to include 
the characteristics  of  all ether potential  countries of destination,  snd the 
increase in the number of variables would  rapidly drive the number  of degrees 
of  freedom to zero. 
Table  13  presents  the estimates  of the reduced-fo  equation  in (35) .  The 
sample  consists  of 48 observations  (4 continents  of origin  times 4 post— 1963 
cohorts  times  3 countries of destination)  .  The  regression  in Table  13 
reveals that a small number  of charecteriatics  of the countries  of origin  sod 
the countries  of  destination  do "explain"  a very large fraction  of the 
—46— variance  in the unobserved  quality  of irrsnigrants.  The variables  in the 
reduced  form  equation,  for example,  explain over 80 percent  of the variance 
in  the quality  measures  presented  in Table  12.  Despite  this success, 
however,  it must be noted  that  because  the countries  of origin  are defined  in 
terms of continents,  the two variables  measuring  country—of—origin 
characteristics  (the relative  GN? level and the extent  of income  inequality) 
are, in effect,  averaged  over  a large  and diverse number  of countries.lS  It 
is unclear  what  biases  are caused  by this  aggregation,  but it is imporcant  to 
remembec  that the coefficients  in Table  13 are,  at best,  suggestive  of  the 
underlying  economic  behaviorS 
Both  the GNP of the continent  of origin (relative to  GNP per capita in 
the country  of  destination)  and the inequality  measure  eor the continent  of 
the origin  affect  the quality  of migrants  significantly.  Migrants  from 
wealthier  regions  do bettec  no matter  where they  go, and migrants  from 
regions with large  levels of income  inequality do worse  than  other  migrants. 
Similarly,  the inequality  measure  for the country of destination  has a 
positive  and significant  impact on relative irrsnigrant earnings,  as predicted 
by the Roy model.  Finally,  the change  in  U.S. insnigration policy (as 
measured  by  USLAW)  has a negative  and  marginally  significant  effect,  and thus 
helps  identify  the impact of this major  change in policy  relative  to other 
countries.  The change  in  U.S. imsigration  policy  lowered the earnings  of 
migrants  by S percent  relative to the earnings  of migrants  who chose othec 
countries  of destination. 
6.  Sumsa 
Self  -selection  plays  a dominant  role  in imsigration  (as it does in all 
other  forms  of  turnover) .  There  is  selection  in the determination  of the 
composition  of the persons  who leave  any given  country,  both in  terms  of 
observable  characteristics  (such as education)  and unobservable 
—47— characteristics  (such as abilities  and productivities)  .  In addition,  this 
non-random  sample  is then  scrted  across  various possible  host countries  in  a 
non—random  way.  hence  the pool of irsnigrants in any host country  is,  in 
a sense, doubly  self-selected:  the pool  of inmigrants  in  the host  country 
are persons  who found  it profitable  to  leave  the country  of origin  and 
who did not find it profitable  to go anywhere else. 
This paper  attempts  to use the economic  theory  of self—selection  as a 
guide  to undersoanding  how irrmtigrants perform  in the labor market.  The 
assumption  of  wealth—maximizing  behavior  provides  important  insights  into the 
mechanics  that  guide the selection process.  It was seen,  for example,  that 
the conditions  required  for positive  (or  negative)  selection  in abilities 
have nothing to do with the conditions  required  for positive  (or negative) 
selection  in  education.  Self—selection  in  abilities  (or unobserved 
characteristics)  is guided  by a comparison  of income  distributions  in the 
country  of origin  and the country of  destination:  Positive (negative) 
selection  occurs when the income distribution  in  the country of origin  has 
lass (more)  variance  than  the income distribution  in the country  of 
destination,  self-selection  in  education,  on the other  hand,  is based 
entirely  on a comparison  of which country attaches  a higher  value  to 
educational  attainment.  Thus it is possible  foo a given  country  of 
dastination  to attract highly  educated  persons,  but that  these  highly 
educated  migrants  are the least productive  in  the population  of highly 
educated  workers. 
The empirical  analysis  studied  the role  played  by self—selection  in  the 
earnings  of immigrants  in the U.S.,  and compared  these  migrants  to the pool 
of migrants  who chose  to reside  in other  countries  (Australia or Canada) 
The study  of the various  Censuses  revealed  that the U.S.,  as a result of 
major  changes  in immigration  policy, began  to attract  relatively  less 
—48— skUled  persona  in the 1970s,  In a  sense,  the U.S. became  less cornpet.— 
tive  in the international  marketplace  that  determines  the migration 
decision  and the sorting of migrants  across  host countries. 
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1These  statistics  are available  in United  Nations  (1982, p.  44) .  The 
calculations  ignore  the large  (and presumably)  temporary  flows  from  Ethiopia 
to Somalia  in  the late 1970s,  es well  as the movement  of guest  workers  to oil 
producing  countries  in the Middle  East. 
2A recent survey  of this literature  is given  by Greenwood  and McDowell 
(1986) 
Jasso and Rosenrweig  (1985) also  stress  this  important  technical  point 
in their  work. 
4A fourth  csse where  Q  > C  and Q  < 0 is theoreticslly  impossible  amos 
it reotares  P > 1. 
Data  on  international  differences  in  income inequality  are published 
by the World  Bank (1986)  .  These  data, however,  do not correspond  direotly 
to the variances  which  lie at the heart of the Roy model.  In particular,  a  and  c( measure  the dispersion  in "opportunities"  (for given  X(, rather  than 
the variance  in incomes across  households  in  a given country. 
6There is a slight  technical  problem which must  be taken  into  account in 
the derivation  of this result.  An increase  in C1 "stretches"  the income 
distribution  of  the U.S.,  and will lead  to a different mean wage level  in 
the pool of migrants  even if this  pool  is restricted  to include the same 
persona.  A simple  solution  to this problem  is to define  quality in  terms  of 
"standardized  units",  or  Q1  Ic1 .  The prediction  in  the text ran then  be 
easily  derived. 
7The  determinants  of  the two tpes of  selection,  however,  are not all 
that  different  at a much more  fundamental  level.  The sorting  in observed 
characteristics  is guided  by international  differences  in the prices  and 
3,  .  In  the case of unobserved  characteristics,  the variances  c  and cI  are 
measures  of the "prices"  of unobserved  ability aince this type of ability  is 
better  rewarded  in countries  with  higher  levels of income  inequality.  The 
sorting  in unboserved  characteristics,  therefore,  is also  guided  by 
international  differences  in  the relevant prices. 
8There  ia an implicit assumption  in  (25)  which  is directly  responsible  for this simple  framework.  In particular, growth  rates for insnigranta ace 
independent  of  the year of  migration  9.  The model  can be generalized  to 
allow  for these  typea  of intersctions.  However,  the estimating  equations 
would  includer  higher-order  polynomials  and the estimation  of the underlying 
structural  parameter  may become  quite sensitive  to the very high  correlation 
among  the right-hand  aide  variables. 
—SC— 9The construction  of the data  sets is described  in detail in Sorjas 
(1987) 
10The  enrollment  data is  available  in United  Nations  Educational, 
Social,  and Cultural  Organization  (1969,1980).  Enrollments  are available 
for each "level"  of education.  The data sources  also give  the number  of 
years  of education  associated  with  that "level" for each  country. 
The means  presented  in Table  2 are calculated  using  both  of these 
statistics. 
lt  is also  consistent  with  the hypothesis  that migration  costs  are 
lower  for persons with  higher  education  levels.  This hypothesis  has 
received  intensive  study in the migration  literature;  see, for example, 
Schwartz  (1968) 
is important  to note  that many  of these differences  in  guality 
across  cohcrts  from a given  country of origin  are statistically  significant 
at conventional  levels.  For some evidence  on this  point  see Borjas  (1987). 
13Since  the dependent  variable  in  the "second—stage"  regressions  is a 
linear function  of regression  coefficients,  the regressions  are weighted  to 
account  for neteroscedasticity.  See Borjas  (1987)  for details. 
14A number  of previous  studies  (e.g.,  Tandon,  1978; Chiswick  and 
Miller,  1983;  and  Chiswick,  1987) analyze the labor market  performance  of 
immigrants  in Australia  and Canada.  These  studies,  however, do not study 
the non—random  sorting  of  migrants  across host  countries. 
section  is based on  the excellent  descriptions  and summ2ries  of 
immigration  policies  given  by Soyd (1976),  Keely (1979), Keely  and  Elwel 
(1981)  ,  Kubat  (1979), and Price  (1978) 
16Throughout  this section, the entire native  base in each  of the host 
countries  is the entire  population  of  native—persons  (regardless of ethnic 
or racial  origin) 
-  This differs  from  the native  baselines  chosen in the 
previous  section,  but makes  the comparisons  among  host countries  less 
arbitrary 
17There  are some  differences  in the calendar  years  bracketed  by these 
dummy  variables  across  the countries  of  destination.  The brackets  reported 
in the table  are those  that  apply  to  U.S. data.  The Canadian  and Australian 
brackets  are quite similar for  post-1960  migrants,  but differ  for pre—1960 
migrants. 
18The average  was calculated  over  the two or three  source  countries  that 
formed  the bulk of immigration  from  that continent  to the particular  host 
country. 
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—53— TABLE 1 
Unstandardized  U.S.  Earnings of Immigrants  Relative  to WhIte Natives 
1970 
Country  1965-69  Sample 
Europe:  All 1mm.  Cohort  Size 
Austria  .1969  .2182  380 
Czechoslovakia  .1229  .0466  398 
Denmark  .1208  .1803  141 
France  .1109  -.0766  317 
Germany  .1600  .1095  2399 
Greece  —.1722  —  .3704  634 
Hungary  .1304  -.0631  650 
Ireland  —  .0369 
- .0260  754 
Italy  —  .0150  -.1707  3068 
Netherlands  .0643  .1412  430 
Norway  .1653  .2629  243 
Poland  .0392  —.0952  1629 
Portugal  —  .1913 
— .2406  349 
Romania  .1153  —.1915  259 
Spain  —.1572  - .3480  210 
Sweden  .1485  .2573  221 
Switzerland  .2424  .0095  177 
United Kingdom  .1669  .1902  2231 
USSR  .0813  -.1048  907 
Yugoslavia  .0353  —  .1382  646 
Asia and Africa 
China  —.1543  —  .3459  880 
Egypt  —  .0073  —.2127  136 
India  .1667  .0413  363 
Iran  —  .0116  — .3556  121 
Israel  .0707  — .1951  141 
Japan  .0535  .0519  228 
Korea  —.0781  —.2183  142 
Philippines  —.1920  -.2389  816 
Americas: 
Argentina  .0319  — .1644  218 
Brazil  .0212  —.0993  101 
Canada  .1072  .1084  3430 
Colombia  —  .1452  - .2337  254 
Cuba  -  .2822  - .4461  1960 
Domin. Rep.  —.3576  -.5157  210 
Ecuador  —  .2343  —  .LS11  174 
Guatemala  -.1940  -  .5372  82 
Haiti  — .3041  —.3061  130 
Jamaica  — .1645  -  .2462  263 
Mexico  —.4094  -.6021  3122 
Panama  —  .0187  -  .1899  101 
Trin.  & Tobago —  .1561  -  .2909  86 
1980 
1965—69  1975—79  Sample 
All 1mm.  Cohort  Cohort  Size 
.2108  .3598  —.1258  746 
.1483  .1141  .0273  872 
.2387  .3570  .4241  291 
.1071  .1158  .2237  952 
.1577  .2350  .2646  6499 
—.1874  —  .2556  -  .3392  2328 
.1059  .1027  -.1805  1356 
.0688  .0737  —.1421  1580 
—  .0124  -  .0790  - .1616  7236 
.1717  .2179  .2824  1161 
.2696  .4183  .2444  408 
.0165  .0207  — .3698  3278 
-  .2104  —.1949  —  .3240  2213 
.0551  .0928  —  .2913  614 
—  .0417 
- .0184  —  .2143  730 
.2392  .4570  .1617  335 
.3307  .2121  .4735  397 
.2111  .3188  .1924  5475 
— .0533  —.0578  —  .2856  2104 
.0546  —.0191  —.1706  1967 
-  .2212  -.1324  -  .5372  3875 
.0737  .3222  —.2892  696 
.1221  .4050  —.2085  3629 
—.0545  .1375  —.2237  1027 
—  .0274  - .0392  — .2483  789 
.1362  .1492  .2020  1634 
—.0881  .2409  —.3007  2013 
— .0707  .0694  —  .3143  4955 
—  .0096  .0086  —  .1428  834 
.0485  .1407  .0481  345 
.1258  .1440  .1739  7083 
—.2313  —  .2027  —  .4464  3760 
-.1828  —.2698 
— .5392  6837 
— .4768  —  .4319  —  .6785  1605 
— .2473  —.2858  —.5229  1097 
— .3425  - .2182  -  .5977  723 
-.3726  -.2296  -.6536  3133 
—.2132  -.1245  -  .3604  2061 
— .3975  —.3431  —  .6402  24955 
— .0761  — .1263  —.3663  584 
—.1488  —.0685  —.4150  782 TABLE  2 
Completed  Years  of  Schooling  in Immigrant  Cohorts 
Mean  Education 
Year  of  Arrival  in Population 
Country  1975-79  1970-74  1965-69  1960—64  1970s  1960s 
Europe: 
Austria  14.3  13.9  13.4  12.8  8.7  6.7 
Czechoslovakia  15.4  14.5  14.1  12.5  10.2  9.1 
Denmark  15.5  13.6  16.1  11.6  11.2  8.5 
France  15.6  14.3  14.5  12.3  11.1  7.0 
Germany  15.2  14.2  13.3  12.0  10.7  10.1 
Greece  11.1  9.9  8.8  10.9  9.2  6.2 
Hungary  13.6  13.5  12.3  12.6  10.6  7.2 
Ireland  13.3  13.1  12.9  11.3  9.1  8.1 
Italy  10.6  8.5  6.8  7.5  9.1  3.6 
Netherlands  15.9  15.1  14.1  12.3  10.4  8.8 
Norway  15.2  15.6  14.0  11.7  9.9  7.2 
Poland  12.7  11.9  10.7  9.5  11.2  7.0 
Portugal  6,6  6.7  5.2  5.8  8.2  3.5 
Romanja  13.7  14.5  11.6  11.9  9.5  5.3 
Spain  13.2  11.3  10.3  9.9  8.0  4.4 
Sweden  15.4  15.8  15.5  14.4  10.3  8.7 
Switzerland  15.4  15.4  14.5  13.6  8-7  6.7 
United  Kingdom  15.1  14.7  13.7  13.1  10.8  9.9 
USSR  14.3  13.5  10.5  11.3  11.4  8.1 
Yugoslavia  11.0  10.6  10.7  9.4  9.7  3.5 
Asia and Africa: 
China  11.3  12.8  12.8  13.2  8.4  4.3 
Egypt  15.9  16.2  15.5  15.1  5.7  4.0 
India  16.1  17.6  16.7  17.0  4.9  2.2 
Iran  15.2  16.3  15.3  15.5  3.6  1.3 
Israel  14.2  13.8  13.5  14.0  9.8  7.0 
Japan  13.7  14.7  15.4  15.0  11.2  9.2 
Korea  14.0  14.9  15.8  16.5  8.0  5.0 
Philippines  14.2  14.9  14.8  13.9  8.2  5.1 
Americas: 
Argentina  13.6  12.1  12.0  12.6  8.7  6.3 
Brazil  15.4  13.1  12.6  12.8  8.6  2.8 
Canada  14.6  13.7  12.9  11.4  10.3  8.5 
Colombia  11.9  11.3  10.6  11.5  5.0  2.2 
Cuba  11.3  9.9  9.5  11.9  8.3  4.1 
Domin,  Rep.  8.9  9.1  8.4  7.9  6.2  3.6 
Ecuador  10.9  11.0  10.4  11.3  6.2  3.4 
Guatemala  9.0  9.7  9.9  12.0  2.9  1.3 
Haiti  10.2  12.1  12.0  11.2  3.2  1.7 
Jamaica  11.3  10.9  10.7  10.6  9.5  4.5 
Mexico  6.5  6.8  6.1  6.0  6.1  2.9 
Panama  13.1  12.7  12.4  11.1  10.1  5.9 
Trin.  & Tobago  11.7  12.0  11.0  14.4  7.9  7.1 TA3LE 3 
Present Value  Differentials Between Immigrants  and Natives* 
Year  of Arrival 
1975—79  1970—74  1965—69  1960—64  1950—59  <1950 
oe: 
Austria  -.0841  .1344  .1945  .0707  -.0004  —.0312 
(-.74)  (1.25)  (2.84)  (1.33)  (-.01)  (-.44) 
Czechoslovakia  -.0141  -.0546  -.0036  .0609  .0182  .0596 
(-.14)  (-.73)  (-.10)  (1.01)  (.42)  (.90) 
Denmark  .4432  .0623  .1522  -.0010  -.0434  .1105 
(2.76)  (.35)  (1.45)  (-.01)  (-.65)  (.94) 
France  .1879  .0829  —.0415  —.1179  —.0626  .0539 
(2.29)  (1.15)  (-.74)  (-2.57)  (-1.56)  (.81) 
Germany  .0733  .0638  .0385  .0115  .0150  .1174 
(1.69)  (1.50)  (1.44)  (.60)  (.97)  (4.26) 
Greece  -.1060  -.1818  -.1344  -.0402  -.0381  -.1230 
(-2.00)  (-5.08)  (—4.40)  (—1.10)  (-1.39)  (-2,28) 
Hungary  —.1542  —.1132  —.0128  —.0389  .0380  .1441 
(—1.94)  (—1.81)  (—.26)  (—.86)  (1.45)  (2.55) 
Ireland  .1267  .0817  .1758  .0676  —.0252  —.2171 
(1.58)  (1.39)  (3.75)  (2.14)  (-.84)  (—4.82) 
Italy  .0498  .0424  .0693  .0839  .0695  .0627 
(1.30)  (1.75)  (3.77)  (5.04)  (5,10)  (2.48) 
Netherlands  .2815  —.0917  .0936  .0264  —.0442  —.5736 
(3.66)  (-1.11)  (1.69)  (.70)  (-1.40)  (-2.77) 
Norway  .1880  .2468  .1757  .2017  .1437  —.0290 
(1.45)  (1.56)  (1.74)  (2.55)  (2.48)  (—.35) 
Poland  —.1926  .0727  .0784  .0387  .0526  .0764 
(—4.11)  (1.95)  (2.65)  (1.66)  (2.44)  (2.31) 
Portugal  .0293  .0348  .0785  .0954  .0871  .1746 
(Cl)  (.82)  (2.31)  (2.44)  (2.18)  (2.11) 
Romania  -.2030  .0911  -  .0050  -  .0253  .0534  -  .0041 
(-2.12)  (1.21)  (-.10)  (-.39)  (1.04)  (-.01) 
Spain  .1047  .1287  .0518  —.0022  —.1186  —.1001 
(1.17)  (2.01)  (.96)  (-.01)  (-2.22)  (-.94) TABLE  3  (continued) 
1950-59  <1950 
Year 
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(2.88) 
- .0309 




(-10  .26) 
—  .1186 
(-1.46) 
-  .1635 
(-2.94) 
-  .0084 
(-  .10) 
— .2346 
(-3.32) 



























-  .0588 
(—  .82) 
—  .0497 









































—  .0065 
(-  .26) 
—.1842 
(—6.88) 
—  .0980 
(-1.34) 




-.  1978 
(-3.10) 
—.040  1 
(-.71) 








.037  1 
(.73) 
- .0207 
(-  .32) 
.0060 
(.10) 






—.049  7 
(—  .83) 






(-2.97)  (—3.69) 
.0679  -.0944 
(.54)  (—.91) 
.1440  .0497 
(4.07)  (1.51) 
— .1908  -  .0822 
(-3,10)  (-1.47) 
.0623  .0782 
(.75)  (.88) 
.1149  .0681 
(5.27)  (4.24) TABLE 3 (continued) 
*The t-ratios are presented in parentheses, 
Arrival 
1975-79  19i0-74  19-69  1960-64  tr 
Co  lomb  i  a 























































































-  .2182 
(-4.51) 
-  .0780 
(-1.67) 




-  .0628 
(-3.52) 
























-.0438  - .0002  .0981  -.1023 TABLE  4 
Definition  of  Aggregate  Variables* 
VARIABLE  Definition 
FREE  = 1  if the coantry had a competitive  party system  at the 
time of  migration;  0 otherwise 
C0MfUNIST  = 1  if the country had a communist  government  at the time 
of  migration;  0 otherwise 
LOSTEREE  = 1  if the  country  lost a competitive  party  system  within 
the last 10 years; 0 otherwise 
INEQUALITY  = Ratio of household  income  of the top 10 percent  of the 
households  to the income of the bottom  20 percent of the 
household  circa  1970 
UNEMPL0YENT  Unemployment  rate in the U.S.  at  the time  of migration 
USLAW  1 if migration  occurred  after  1970; 0 otherwise 
ENGLISI{  Fraction  of 1975-80 cohort  of immigrants  who speak English 
well or very well 
DISTANCE  Number  of air miles  (in thousands)  between  the country's 
capital and the nearest U.S.  gateway  (Los Angeles,  Miami, 
& New York) 
iGNP  Difference in (ln)GNP per capita between  the country of 
origin  and the U.S. at the time of  migration 
*See Borjas  (1987)  for additional  details on the creation  of  these 
variables. Determinants 
TABLE 5 




Coefficient  t 
—.1574  (—1.61) 
.402  .382 
h 
h  (USLAW=0) 
h(USLAW1)  -  -  - .0419  (-3.79) 
*All  the variables  in the structural equation are interacted with 
X,  the selection variable.  See equation  (12)  for details. 
Structural 
Equation* 
Coefficient  t 
—.0537  (—1.70)  CONSTANT 
FREE  .0410  (1.45) 
CO1TJNIST  .0113  (.37) 
LOSTFREE  -.0333  (- .93) 
INEQUALITY  - .0040  (-1.79) 
UNEMPL0YNT  .0334  (1.81) 
USLAW  -.1593  (-2.61) 
ENGLISH  .0797  (1.70) 
DISTANCE  .0003  (.05) 
GNP  .0495  (4.02) 
.0336 
.0072 
—  .0106 
—  .0029 
.0  108 










.0085 TABLE  6 














Coefficient  t 
4.7096  (2.47) 
.3114  (2.36) 
2.8316  (6.04) 
1.6397  (2.26) 
1.0629  (1.78) 
-  .0162  (-  .33) 
—  .0773  (—  .27) 
.2035  (.18) 
.742]  (7.58) 
—.7147  (—2.47) 
Structural 
E  qua  t  i  0  fl 
Coefficient  t 
—3.8914  (—2.05) 
.1069  (1.00) 
.5720  (3.47) 
— .1179  (—.50) 
1.3546  (6.25) 
—.0293  (—1.78) 
—  .0413  (—  .42) 
.3530  (.97) 
.639 
4.6351  (6.65) 
.577 
4.6972  (9.33) 
*All the variables  in the structural  equation  (except for the 
constant  and p ) are  interacted with X.  The variable  X is introduced 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All  Immigrants 
TABLE  9 
Summary Statistics 


















1970  1980 
£n(w)  EDUC  N  £n(w)  EDUC  N 
8.99  115  28978  9.61  12.7  15071 
8.88  13.3  3495  9.47  14.6  25288 
8.88  13.9  172  9.40  15.3  2622 
9.06  10.8  16922  9.69  12.1  42734 
8.67  9.2  7507  9.23  9.4  48929 




EDUC  N 
1981 
in(w)  EDUC  N 
8.82  9.9  28049  9.79  11.3  61205 
6.72  13.2  409  9.66  13.6  2372 
8.86  14.1  119  9.74  14.0  504 
8.86  10.0  6633  9.86  10.9  12193 
8.72  12.0  223  9.60  12.1  1229 
8.86  10.5  8018  9.81  11.7  17417 
Australia 
__________  1981 
in(w)  EDUC 
9.39  11.6 
9.34  12.9 
9.45  13.1 
9.34  11,4 
9.35  12.1 







9936 TABLE 10 
1980/1981 Cross—Section Regressions 




Coeff  t 
Australia 
Coeff  t  Coeff  t 
Natives: 
CONSTANT  6.6488  (76.33)  7.0465  (193.01)  6.3522  (104.68) 
EDUC  .0587  (33.92)  .0510  (76.26)  .0908  (58.77) 
AGE  .0841  (20.17)  .0873  (49.42)  .0886  (32.01) 
AGE2  - .0009  (-18.00)  -.0009  (-45.21)  -OOll  (—34.61) 
MAR  .3151  (23.53)  .2973  (51.10)  .2727  (31.31) 
HLTH  -.3337  (-15.15) 
—  —  —  - 
URBAN  .1545  (12.07)  .1036  (22.78)  .1605  (16.61) 
R2  .193  .171  .245 
Immigrants: 
CONSTANT  6.6378  (223.77)  7.3415  (95.72)  6.7307  (66.17) 
EDUC  .0497  (133.61)  .0415  (40.97)  .0748  (35.59) 
AGE  .0802  (55.39)  .0710  (19.31)  .0779  (16.86) 
AGE2 
— .0009  (-51.35)  -.0008  (—18.44)  —.0010  (-18.70) 
MAR  .2325  (50.52)  .2190  (18.42)  .2013  (14.16) 
HILTH  -.3502  (-34.48) 
—  -  -  - 
URBAN  .0574  (9.43)  -.0016  (-.  16)  .1079  (5.41) 
Y70  .2107  (36.81)  .1609  (9.73)  .0444  (2.11) 
Y65  .3141  (51.89)  .2816  (18.03)  .0491  (2.36) 
Y60  .3750  (56.74)  .2825  (15.39)  .0810  (3.68) 
150  .4436  (74.88)  .3679  (25.59)  .0811  (4.18) 
Y40  .4752  (64.63)  .4287  (17.50)  .1159  (4.63) 
R2  .226  .163  .188 TABLE 11 
Earnings Differentials Between Immigrants  and Natives  in 
1980—81 Cross_Sections* 
Origin and  Immigrant  Cohort 
Destination  1975-80  1970—74  1965-69  1960-64  1950—59  (1950 
All Immigrants 
in: 
USA  —.3460  —  .1534  —  .0676  — .0239  .0177  .0045 
(-14.48)  (—10.42)  (-6.91)  2.58)  (1.79)  (.39) 
Canada  —  .2271  —.1118  —.0286  — .0571  —.0020  .0558 
(—9.52)  (-6.61)  (-2.35)  (-3.99)  (-.22)  (2.78) 
Australia  —.0810  —.0642  —.0814  —.0656  —.0796  —.0342 
(—2.51)  (—2.87)  (-4.98)  (-4.05)  (-6.06)  (-162) 
The t-ratios are presented in parentheses. TABLE  12 
Present  Value Differentials Between Immigrants and Natives* 
*The  t-ratios are presented in  parentheses. 
1950—59  <1950  Group 














































































-  .1688 
(—1.01) 




























-  .3651 
(—6.38) 
























































































Latin American Immigrants; 
USA 
Canada 
AustraU,a TABLE 13 
Determinants  of Immigrant  Quality Across  Host Countries 
VARIABLEa  Coefficient  t 
CONSTANT  .1252  (-2.77) 
USLAW  -.0511  (—1.79) 
UNEMPLOYMENT  .0011  (.18) 
INEQUALITY(O)  -.0044  (-1.89) 
INEQUALITY(1)  .0431  (4.35) 
dGNP  .0903  (8.78) 
R2  .881 
*Key  to additional  variables:  UNEMPLOYMENT  unemployment  rate in 
the host country at the time of migration;  INEQUALITY(O)  =  average  income 
inequality  (as defined in Table 4) in selected  countries  from  continent  of 
origin  in decade  of migration;  INEQUALITY(1)  = inequality measure  for des- 
tination  countries  in decade of  migration;  LIGNP =  difference  in (ln)GNF 
per capita  between sending  and host countries  at time of  migration. 